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ABSTRACT
In August of 1905, American newspapers reported that the Greek Orthodox 
Bishop of the American Antioch, Rafa’el Hawaweeny, asked his Syrian migrant 
congregation to lay down their lives for him and kill two prominent Maronite 
newspaper editors in Little Syria, New York. The sectarian fragmentation of the 
Syrian migrant community led to street riots in the following months. This event 
has been brushed aside in Syrian Diasporic historiography, which is scarce to 
begin with. This project focuses on the lived experience of Syrian migrants in 
Little Syria between 1880 and 1905. The goal was to show how sectarianism 
was reproduced in Little Syria behind the fagade of a monolithic national 
community. This has been done by analyzing events like the street riot that 
took place on September 18th, 1905, New York newspapers, and Syrian 
diasporic newspapers. After thorough analysis of these sources, it becomes 
evident that the xenophobia faced by the Syrian migrant community forced 
them to turn inward to survive. The vulnerability of the community was 
manipulated by competitive members of the cosmopolitan elite, who sought to 
influence and guide the community. The literary cosmopolitan elite reproduced 
sectarianism through print media in order to destroy their rivals. Sectarian 
divisions reproduced by Syrian diasporic newspapers led to newspaper wars, 
which escalated to street riots when Bishop Hawaweeny was caught between 
the cross-fires. Through emphasizing the power of print-capitalism, this 
research highlights the importance of xenophobia in shaping multiple, 
overlapping identities in the Syrian diaspora, allowing sectarianism to 
reproduce and prosper.
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Foreword
On September 11th, 2001, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the western 
end Pentagon by five hijackers affiliated with Al-Qaeda, a militant Islamic 
organization. There were fourteen additional hijackers on three other planes. Two 
places crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York. The 
third plane was meant to crash in Washington D.C, but the passengers of United 
Airlines Flight 93 overcame hijackers and the plane crashed into a field in 
Pennsylvania. The horrendous events of that day led to a nation-wide panic, as the 
American society redefined what it meant to be a Middle Eastern immigrant in the 
United States. Violent attacks against Middle Eastern descendants were wide spread. 
Americans with brown/olive skin-complexions were denounced as “terrorists.”
In reaction to the growing unrest, some Lebanese-descendants living in the 
United States began considering themselves Phoenician or French. Phoenician and 
French ancestry was more attractive than Arab ancestry, because of their glorious 
histories as advanced civilizations. Identifying with a more glorious imagined past was 
not an isolated incident for Lebanese migrants, but a pattern of reaction to Western 
xenophobia in attempt to authenticate themselves and their enterprising talents in their 
adopted homelands.1 Asher Kaufman suggests that the myth of Phoenician ancestry 
also reflected the attempt to illustrate the Lebanese contribution to Western society, 
since Phoenician civilization contributed to Ancient Greek civilization due to its
1 See Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp, So Far fro m  Allah, So Close to Mexico: M iddle Eastern Im m igrants in 
M odern Mexico  (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 134-138.
1
monopolization of Mediterranean trade.2 In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
journalist Victor Berard argues that Hellenic religion and mythology were of Semitic 
origin, crediting the Phoenicians as the cradle of Western civilization. Lebanese 
nationalists adopted Berard’s theory to justify Lebanon as a nation. Lebanese 
immigrants throughout the mahjar adopted the Phoenician myth as well, to justify 
themselves to their neighbors during times of unrest.
In the moments of intense xenophobia against Syrian migrants, migrant 
identities became complex. The identities which shaped and fragmented the Syrian 
migrant community temporarily decreased in importance in order to effectively defend 
the community. These identities were shaped according to religion, sect, and place of 
origin. Events following September 11th united all the sects of the Arab immigrant 
community in the United States (Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Maronite, Melkite, and Greek 
Orthodox) as they were threatened by their neighbors and followed by Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) agents. Although they presented a united front through their 
origin of ancestry, they maintained their underlying sectarian divisions by remaining 
socially isolated from one another. Sectarianism is the loyal adherence to one’s 
religious subdivision, which encourages intense bigotry and discrimination against 
other sects.
Sectarian conflict is not a new phenomenon and sectarianism is not a “buzz­
word” to describe the events occurring in the Middle East today. There is a long 
history of sectarian solidarity and conflict in the region as different sectarian groups 
vied for political power. There were three major civil wars in Lebanon (1860, 1956,
2 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search fo r  Identity in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 78.
2
and 1975) which were due to the imbalance of political powers attributed to the 
differing sectarian populations. All of these civil wars devastated the Lebanese 
population and forced mass migrations.3 The immigrants did not shed their sectarian 
identity when they added their new mahjar (diasporic) identity and reinforced their 
national identity. These identities sometimes fragmented the community and would 
often unite the community in the face of foreign threat.
The violent events following September 11th were not the first time sectarian 
identities were set aside within the Syrian diaspora. These recurrent themes began over 
a century ago in Little Syria, New York, as the first wave of Syrians emigrated from 
the Ottoman Empire.4 These Syrian immigrants were ushered into the United States 
through Castle Garden in Battery, New York. In 1890, Ellis Island replaced Castle 
Garden as the immigration center for Atlantic immigration to the United States. Syrian 
immigrants looked to the Little Syria neighborhood along Washington Street as their 
“mother colony,” because it was their first point of contact to the United States. 
Naturally, Little Syria was the largest Syrian immigrant colony in the United States.5 
By 1892, the colony had grown large enough to necessitate the publication of the first 
Arabic newspaper in the mahjar, Kawkab America.6
3 In 1860 there was no Lebanon and thus masses of the now Lebanese geographical area were 
considered the Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire.
4 Since this thesis is focusing on the time period betw een 1890 and 1 9 1 7 ,1 will use the term Syrian to  
describe the immigrants since the region they emigrated from was the Syrian province and most of the 
migrants considered them selves Syrian. I recognize that this is problematic, especially after the 
formation of Lebanon, because it does not always correspond with the political affiliation of the  
immigrants them selves.
5 Philip Hitti, The Syrians in America (New York: Doran, 1924), 66.
6 Translated to mean Planet America. Other sources have translated to Star America, but they are 
wrong.
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This work focuses on the multiple identities in Little Syria during the period of 
1890-1905. This research analyzes how sectarianism was important to the 
immigrants, but it would be muffled when there were foreign or domestic threats to 
Syrian communities. This research does not follow a story of assimilation into the 
mahjar, unlike many Syrian diasporic histories. This is a narrative of multiple 
overlapping identities in immigrant communities. Identity is accepted as a monolithic 
phenomenon in these types of communities, when, in fact, the communities have 
internal divisions based on class, regional, and religious differences transpiring from 
their homeland. Hegemony due to ancestral commonalities overshadows these factions 
for a short period of time, when the community confronts a foreign threat. This 
research is most relevant to show how sectarian identities transpire into the Syrian 
diaspora and what lessons can we learn from these historical processes. It also presents 
how the Syrian people have been able to put aside these sectarian identities for the 
good of their community. Although this is not a study of Islamic sects, it is relevant 
because the Christian sects in the Middle East struggle against one another for political 
dominance today. This may be a narrative of identities in the Syrian colony of New 
York, but it can be broadened to exemplify the multiple identities in the entire Syrian 
diaspora and can apply to other diasporas as well.
Beginning in 1880s, there was an infusion of stars and stripes as the Syrian 
immigrants landed in Castle Gardens and adopted an American identity. Although 
they accepted this new mahjar, they did not become a homogeneous community as 
Syrian-Americans, but rather built their sectarian identities in the mahjar.
4
Introduction
A sense of romanticism lingers along the exotic Washington Street, where red 
fezzes bob up and down as olive-skinned people hurry about. Peddlers speed off on 
bikes, rushing to sell their Jerusalem-made goods and lace. Along the street, men 
smoke out of long water pipes and drink Turkish coffees at the quaint cafes. Small 
shops have exotic symbols hanging from their doors and sell dry groceries, glass 
bracelets, swords, lamps, water pipes, and native alcohol. These same symbols are 
seen on circulating newspapers which appear to be read backwards. Restaurants serve 
variations of dishes with different parts of lamb and raw lamb. People live crammed in 
tenement dens of “grime and order.”7 The year is 1899 in the Syrian quarter of New 
York City, where about 3,000 were residing.
During the Great Migration of 1880 to 1914, there was a peak of immigration 
to the United States.8 The best known of these immigrants are the Italians and the 
Greeks, whereas the 90,000 Syrian immigrants are neglected by the majority of 
scholars. The majority of the Syrian migrants in the United States were Christians, 
most being Greek Orthodox and Maronite. Syrians emigrated for three main reasons: 
to escape conscription into the Ottoman Army, the sectarian tensions that burdened the 
Syrian province, and the promise of economic opportunities in the United States. 
Ottoman Syrian immigrants settled throughout the Americas, Australia, Europe, and
7 Cromwell Childe, "New York's Syrian Quarter," N ew  York Times, August 20 ,1899 .
8 Many people attribute the Great Migration to the migration of African Americans from below to 
Mason-Dixon Line to Northern Cities. However this period was the greatest peak of international 
immigration to the United States as well. For this purpose I will use the term Great Migration to also 
include external immigration.
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the Caribbean, but the majority settled along the East Coast in major cities such as 
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.
The Syrian immigrants were very diverse in the workforce after emigrating. 
Many of the earliest settlers were recruited by shop owners to be peddlers, linking 
them to a transnational commerce system. Syrian migrants saw greater profit in 
peddling Jerusalem-made goods rather than working in factories like the Eastern 
European immigrants.9 Peddling also did not require much training, capital or 
language skills. This allowed for women and children to join the diasporic economy 
by peddling lace and buttons. Syrian peddlers tirelessly bicycled manufactured goods 
from the supply centers in New York’s Little Syria to vast geographical regions in the 
Americas, bridging the chasm between industrial New York and the rural American 
countryside. These peddlers brought manufactured goods to the farmer’s front door, 
transforming rural inhabitants into consumers. Housewives came to rely on them and 
their flexible payment plans.10 Mexican rebels and soldiers also relied on the Syrian 
peddlers during the Mexican Revolution, because these peddlers were able to cross the 
United States-Mexican Border to smuggle dry goods and guns back into Mexico. The 
peddlers sold these scarce goods to the Mexicans.11 However, peddling was 
considered a menial job, reserved only for the lowest-class.
9 Peddlers would make about $1,000 annually whereas factory workers averaged about $650 annually. 
See Alixa Naff, Becoming American and the Early Arab Im m igrant Experience (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1993).
10 Ibid, 125
11 See Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp. So Far from . Allah, So Close to Mexico: M iddle Eastern Im m igrants in 
M odern Mexico  (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), for more about the role of Syrian Peddlers 
during the Mexican Revolution.
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Most Syrian immigrants who began peddling eventually aspired be shop 
owners. Most did succeed in establishing their own shops and some built factories. By 
1924, thirty-five kimono manufacturers on Washington Street were owned by Syrian 
immigrants and there were twenty-five Syrian-owned silk factories in New Jersey. 
Some immigrants immediately set up their shops with Oriental-made goods in the 
mahjar. Migrants used their kin trade networks throughout the diaspora to maintain the 
importation of their goods. These diasporic kin networks extended from the Ottoman 
Empire to Egypt to Canada, Colonial French West Africa, North America, South 
America, and the Caribbean. The Canadian and Mexican kinship networks allowed for 
smuggling of products and people across the border. As borders solidified against 
Syrian immigration in the 1920s and 1930s, Syrian migrants became more creative in 
their smuggling endeavors. Peddlers used French passports to move freely across the 
borders after Syrian territory became a French Mandate. Syrians also used these 
methods to smuggle countrymen into Jamaica and Trinidad, which specifically barred 
Syrian migrants. Syrian shop owners maintained their kin networks to be successful, 
and imported Syrian-made goods (including diasporic newspapers and literature) 
throughout the mahjar.
Those who did not become merchants in the mahjar may have been restaurant 
owners, butchers, brokers, or hair dressers. When Syrian Sunni Muslims began 
migrating at higher volumes, most chose to work in the Detroit industrial plants. The 
highest migrant socio-economic class was the cosmopolitan literate elite, which was 
made up of writers, newspaper owners, and professors in Little Syria. The first Syrian 
migrant family to settle in the United States, the Arbeely family, constructed the
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cosmopolitan migrant elite in the diaspora. The descendants of Doctor Arbeely 
became doctors and translators. They also founded Syrian aid associations and the 
Kawkab America newspaper. The Arbeely brothers influenced the Syrian immigrant 
masses, as the first point of contact into the United States. Najib Arbeely worked as a 
translator for the Bureau of Immigration in attempt to ease the migration process for 
Syrians. N a’um Mokarzel, Najib Diab, and other newspaper owners also became part 
of this elite as they used their newspapers to connect the mahjar and influence the 
masses. Other members of the Syrian elite were famous writers like Ameen Rihany 
and Khalil Gibran, whose literary works are popular in American society today. The 
cosmopolitan elite resided in New York, the center of American culture and print 
capitalism.
The largest Syrian immigrant colony was on Washington Street in Manhattan’s 
Lower West Side.12 This area was called “Little Syria” by New Yorkers and “Ahl al- 
Shmal” by the Syrian inhabitants.13 Renaming the street after their motherland and the 
Arab-styled shops proved the New York newspapers correct when they reported that 
the residents of Washington Street maintained their Syrian identity, customs, 
garments, and ways of thinking. Syrians crossed the Atlantic Ocean, with their 
sectarian solidarities and strife, to settle along the American East Coast. The sectarian
12 New York newspapers, such as the New York Tribune and the Sun were calling these immigrant 
enclaves colonies. The first being the New York Tribune in 1892. See "A Picturesque Colony: Syrians 
Settled in the First War," The N ew  York Tribune, October 2 ,1892 . Ahl al-Shmal translates to mean 
people of the North or Syria
13 The exact parameters of Little Syria are difficult to determine. It included the intersection with 
Rector Street, Greenwich Street. Little Syria does not exist today, most of its residence moved to 
Atlantic Avenue by 1945 after the construction of the Brooklyn Battery tunnel destroyed most of the
neighborhood.
identities transpired from the motherland and took shape in the United States in the 
immigrant communities. Ninety-five percent of the immigrants were of Christian sects 
(Greek Orthodox, Maronite, and Melkite), the other five percent made up Druze and 
Muslim (Sunni and Shiite) sects.14 Sectarianism in the colonies first presented itself as 
a race to establish and strengthen their different congregations. Each congregation 
raised funds to pay for the travels and salary for priests of their respective church from 
Syria. These priests would then construct churches in the mahjar.
After churches were constructed, sectarianism took the most public form 
through community newspaper affiliations in Little Syria: Al- Bayyan was a 
newspaper for the Druze inhabitants, Mir at al-Gharb (Mirror of the West), Kawkab 
America (Planet America), and al- Kalimah (The Word) were the newspapers 
targeting the Greek Orthodox inhabitants, and al-Hoda (The Guidance) was a 
Maronite (Catholic) based newspaper. Arabic newspapers circulated the diaspora to 
keep immigrants updated on the Ottoman Empire. Newspapers in Little Syria also 
served to connect diasporic trade and family networks throughout the western 
hemisphere. The editors of the Arabic newspapers in the diaspora sought to promote 
their views of nationalism through print capitalism. They hoped to shape the politics 
and culture of a Syrian country during the wave of nationalism occurring in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Benedict Anderson famously defined nationalism as an 
“imagined political community... imagined as inherently limited and sovereign.”15 In
15 Benedict Anderson, Im agined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism  
(London: Verso, 1991), 5.
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Imagined Communities, Anderson suggests that print capitalism created the 
imagination of the national community through juxtaposition of local stories and 
stories from other countries. Newspapers and literature made it possible for growing 
numbers of people to think about themselves as a community by relating themselves to 
other communities, thus constructing imaginary borders between themselves and 
others.16
For Syrians in the diaspora, their newspapers imported and utilized their 
vernacular Arabic language so that Syrian migrants would maintain their Syrian 
identities and imagined connections to their homelands. The Syrian newspapers in the 
diaspora also attempted to forge a modernized Syrian nation, acceptable to Western 
ideals. Historian Akram Khater suggests that the newspaper editors sought to 
modernize the Levant by teaching its readers the ways and habits of the civilized 
West, as indicated by the name of the newspapers like Mir ’at al Gharb (The Mirror of 
the West) and al-Hoda (Guidance). Advice on fashion, children-rearing, social 
etiquette, education, communal identity, and woman’s work were common themes 
within the newspaper articles, to draw parallels between American values and Syrian 
values.17 These articles aimed to influence the creation of national values in a new 
Syrian nation.
The “Syrian” national identity was constructed in the mahjar as an imagined 
socio-political collective identity due to the migrant experience in the diaspora. The 
experience of the newcomer status and minority group in the Western world, against
16 Ibid, 35
17 Akram Fouad Khater, Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the M iddle Class in Lebanon, 1870- 
1920  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 88
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the backdrop of Orientalism, constructed this imagined community in the diaspora.
The Syrian literature and newspapers gave the Syrian community a sense of pride of 
common Syrian heritage and presented the migrants as a monolithic friendly 
community. Ancestral ties in the mahjar were reinforced by the newspapers, which 
allowed their readers consciousness of the political debates in the Syrian province.
By keeping Syrian migrants informed about the news of the motherland, the 
immigrants maintained their connection to Syria. The feeling of a collective unity with 
Syrians dispersed in the diaspora as migrants raised funds for Syrian national causes. 
This sense of nationalism only fueled in the wake of the Balkan wars, as the mahjar 
newspapers and literary texts protested for an independent freed Syrian nation. Najib 
Diab, editor of Mira ’at al-Gharb and the most prominent diasporic supporter for a free 
Syria, attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to represent Syria as a nation.
There was also a smaller, but prominent Lebanese nationalist group within the Syrian 
diaspora, headed by the Philadelphia al-Hoda newspaper editor N a’um Mokarzel. 
Mokarzel envisioned and lobbied for a separate Maronite Lebanese nation. He 
attacked all the other Syrian diasporic newspaper writers who called for a Syrian 
nation. Mokarzel maintained close ties with Francois Georges-Picot and attended the 
Paris Peace Conference to advocate for the separate Lebanese nation.18 Syrian migrant 
editors were so emotionally invested in diasporic nationalism that their newspapers led 
to the divisions among the migrant communities based on their various views.
18 Hani Bawardi, The M aking o f Arab Americans: From Syrian Nationalism  to U.S. Citizenship (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2014), 63.
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Print media also reproduced the sectarian collective identities imported from 
the homeland. Mokarzel began multiple conflicts among the newspapers based upon 
sectarianism and politics, attacking other newspapers who promoted inter-sectarian 
relationships. Mokarzel hoped to promote his vision of a Maronite Lebanese nation­
state, separate from Syria and the Ottoman Empire, through fostering sectarian conflict 
in the diaspora. Mokarzel used his newspaper to attack Mira ’at al-Gharb and other 
leaders of the Greek Orthodox Syrian community in the turn of the twentieth century. 
One incident of Mokarzel’s bigotry led to a street fight on Washington Street in 1905 
between the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox immigrants when he attacked the 
Bishop of the Archdiocese, Rafa’el Hawaweeny.19
Syrian migrants united under a Syrian national identity whenever confronted 
with a foreign threat, whether domestically or internationally. This is apparent when 
they united to confront Irish immigrants and the American police when a group of 
Irish immigrants denounced Syria. A skirmish ensued, ending with a Syrian woman in 
the hospital. A united group of Syrians, from all sects, went to the police station to 
demand protection. The immigrants united against the Ottoman Empire, calling for a 
Free Syrian nation-state and formed many political groups in the Syrian Quarter to 
send appeals to create a separate Syrian nation. This resentment of the Ottoman 
Empire spilled into the Syrian diaspora against the Turkish Muslim immigrants in 
Little Syria. Syrian immigrants harassed the Turkish shop owners. When World War I 
broke, the Syrian newspapers urged their communities to join the army to fight the 
Ottoman oppressors and help create an independent Syrian nation. The third threat that
19 Rafa'el Hawaweeny is now referred to as Saint Rafa'el by the Greek Orthodox community.
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allowed Syrian immigrants to place their sectarian identities in the background in lieu 
of their united Syrian identity was the threat of British and French intervention in 
Syria, as each country supported different sectarian groups to exert their influence in 
the region (the British supported the Druze and the French supported the Maronite), 
leading to war and chaos.
Despite the image of a nationally unified migrant group, the sectarianism that 
was imported into the Syrian diaspora continued to fragment the Syrian community. 
The fragmentation of the community led to the constant calls by the literary 
cosmopolitan elite to gap the chasms between the factions and unite for the nationalist 
cause. Writers such as Kahlil Gibran and Ameen Rihany urged the Syrian community 
to unite in order to free Syria from Ottoman rule and foreign influence. The elite also 
united the migrant community against domestic threats. In these cases, sectarian 
identities were only set aside, not destroyed.
Historiography
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw improvements in 
transportation and the spread of industrialism, which led to a peak in transnational 
migrations. Scholars have intensely researched many of the diasporas during in this 
era of displacement, most notably the Irish, Jewish, and Italian diasporas. However, 
migration patterns from the Syrian have been less visible in scholarly works, although 
the Lebanese diaspora alone is estimated to be 8 million, and 4 million still reside in 
Lebanon. Claiming to escape Ottoman tyranny, sectarian tensions, and military 
conscription, early Syrian people emigrated from the Ottoman Empire to the 
Americas, Europe, and West Africa. In the 1920s and 1930s, nation-states in the
13
Americas, Africa, and islands of the Caribbean passed exclusionary laws to prevent 
further Syrian migrations.
The historiography of the Syrian diaspora began in opposition to the United 
States Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, which excluded Syrian people from migrating to the 
• United States. In 1925, Philip Hitti wrote Syrians in America to argue that Syrian 
migrants can assimilate easily. The historiography of the Syrian diaspora and Syrian 
political activism ceased until the exclusionary laws were repealed in the 1960s. The 
suspension of the exclusionary laws and the fiery socio-political atmosphere of the 
Civil Rights, anti-war and counter-culture movements of the 1960s led to a celebration 
of identity. Graduate students began to ask larger questions about social change in 
history and the assimilation of immigrants. Within this context, scholars also 
celebrated the notion of immigrant histories. While in graduate school in the 1960s, 
Alixa Naff was interested in reconstructing the history of the Syrian migrant 
community. She drove throughout the United States to collect artifacts, photographs, 
and oral histories of early Syrian immigrants and donated these primary sources to the 
Smithsonian. N aff s collection revived the historiography of the Syrian diaspora. The 
past decade has moved beyond Naff, to study the transnational and imperial effects of 
the Syrian migrants. Naff repeats Hitti’s argument that the early Syrian migrants 
assimilated and Americanized, unscathed by discrimination.20 Naff believed that 
Syrian peddlers furthered American interests by bridging the chasm between the 
industrious cities and the rural countryside by bringing manufactured products to their 
doorsteps, so they were well-liked by their customers.
20Naff, 4.
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Scholarship since Naff refutes her rosy picture of the migration experience. 
Scholarship of the Syrian diasporic history has since recognized that xenophobia and 
discrimination were essential realities of Syrian migrants. Gregory Orfaela and Jeffrey 
Lesser contributed to N aff s research by expanding upon the labor history of the 
Syrian migrants. Orfaela and Lesser analyze the cultural lives of the peddlers, the 
xenophobia they faced and how they assimilated to United States and Brazilian 
societies.21 Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp refutes N aff s arguments that the Syrian migrants 
assimilated; instead she suggests that acculturation occurred among the Syrian 
migrants at varying rates in response to local xenophobia in Mexico. Velcamp 
suggests that socio-economic success determined whether a migrant identified as 
Syrio-Lebanese or Mexican. The successful migrants identified themselves as 
Lebanese with Phoenician ancestry to justify their wealth, while the others either 
acculturated their identities or identified solely as Mexican to combat xenophobia. 
Velcamp is the first historian to attempt to create a transnational history of Syrian 
migration, by identifying transnational economic and kin network of the migrants.22
Other historians of the Syrian diaspora focus on the racial xenophobia against 
the immigrants, which helped to construct a global color-line.23 Sarah Gualtieri,
21For more information about the labor and assimilation histories of the Syrian immigrants see  Naff; 
Randa A. Kayyali, The Arab Americans (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006); Jeffrey Lesser, Negotiating  
National Identity  (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); and Jeffrey Lesser, Welcoming the 
Undesirables (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
22 See Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp, So Far From Allah, So Close to Mexico: M iddle Eastern Imm igrants in 
M odern Mexico  (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007).
23 Henry Reynolds and Marilyn Lake, Drawing the Global Colour Line: W hite M en's Countries and the 
International Challenge o f Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Although Lake and Reynold do not necessarily show how the Syrian migrants fit into the intellectual 
debates over w hiteness, these intellectual debates led to the waves of exclusionary acts in the United 
States, Canada, the Caribbeans, South American countries, and even colonial French W est Africa in the
15
Michael Suleiman, and John Tehranian analyzes the racial discriminations and 
xenophobia the immigrants faced in the United States.24 Lesser’s work also focuses on 
the Brazilian xenophobic reactions against these “undesirable” immigrants. Christina 
Cirantos researches and analyzes the xenophobic reactions to the Syrian immigrants in 
Argentina.25 Andrew Arsan reconstructed the first comprehensive transnational history 
of Eastern Mediterranean migrations ranging from Ottoman Syria, the United States, 
Marseilles, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan, French Guinea, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger. Arsan argues that racial xenophobia from 
the French colonial settlers, rather than the locals, shaped the ways the Lebanese 
migrants represented themselves and justified their place in the French Empire.26
Other historians who depict the xenophobic reactions to the Syrian immigrants 
specialize in the diasporic histories of other immigrants which overlap with Syrian 
immigrants. Daniel Elazar and Peter Medding focus on the xenophobic reaction to 
Sephardic Jews in Israel and along the Jewish diaspora, which are mostly Syrian Jews. 
Lara Putnam, a Caribbean diasporic specialist, explores the xenophobic reactions to 
the Syrian shop keepers in Jamaica and Trinidad during the Jazz Age. Putnam shows 
that the exclusion acts of the 1920s targeted British West Indians, who returned to
first half of the tw entieth century to restrict Syrian migration. Syrians were viewed by the United 
States government as Asian.
24 See Sarah Gualtieri, Between Arab and W hite: Race and Ethnicity in the Early Syrian-American 
Diaspora (Berkeley: California University Press, 2009); John Tehranian, W hitewashed: America's 
Invisible M iddle Eastern M inority  (New York: New York University Press, 2008).
25 For more information about xenophobic reactions to the Syrian immigrants see  Christina Cirantos, 
Between Argentines and Arabs: Argentine Orientalism, Arab Imm igrants and the Writing o f Identity  
(Albany: University of New York Press, 2006); Daniel J. Elazar and Peter Medding, Jewish Communities 
in Frontier Societies: Argentina, Australia, and South Africa (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983).
26 Andrew Arsan, Interlopers o f Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014).
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their homelands to limited economic opportunities. Jamaicans, in turn, pushed their 
governments to pass exclusion acts against Syrians and Chinese emigrants, who 
“stole” Jamaican jobs. A famous example of Jamaican anti-Syrian sentiment was in an 
article by Marcus Garvey in the Kingston Daily Gleaner on Dec. 12, 1927, describing 
the Syrians and Chinamen as “[sapping] the wealth of this country [Jamaica] while 
[Jamaicans] die in poverty.”27 Although these historians focusing on other diasporic 
peoples, they unintentionally exemplify how diasporic peoples share similar 
experiences in sites of the diaspora. This historians also show how immigrants interact 
with one another, sometimes not in the best ways. The Syrians throughout the diaspora 
claimed the intermediary position between white and black races, and industrial and 
rural regions. Their intermediary positioning in these categories, and their economic 
success created racial xenophobia in their adopted homelands.
It is important to understand these interactions and how the different 
immigrants had similar experiences in their diasporic sites and influenced each other 
in these different communities. Without interaction with the Irish immigrants, the 
Syrian diasporic experience and imagined community created may have taken a 
different shape. The Syrian migrant interaction with the Irish migrants was not 
primarily violent. The Syrians sold goods to the Irish migrants, married Irish migrants, 
and communicated on a daily basis. The Syrians borrowed nation-building 
methodologies from their Irish neighbors.
27 Article in Kingston Daily Gleaner, December 12 ,1927 , rpt. in Lara Putnam, Radical Moves: Caribbean  
M igrants and the Politics o f Race in the Jazz Age  (Raleigh: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2007), 263
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Nationalistic protests and riots were very present among the Irish American 
community even before the first wave of Syrian immigration, as seen by the 1868 
riots. Irish immigrants were also a fragmented community, by regionalism and, 
consequently, sectarianism, but presented a united front when discrimination against 
them began after 183 0.28 Campbell theorizes that the lived experience of the Irish in 
their diasporic sites “and the newcomer’s status as a minority” forged a united national 
identity and destroyed regionalism and sectarianism in the community.29 The Syrians 
did not only interact with Irish migrants, but the “new migrants” as well. Syrian 
migrants were living amongst Greek, Balkan, Italian, and Turkish migrants. This 
exposed the Syrian migrants to constant interaction with national protests from these 
new migrants and their methods of diasporic nation building. The Syrians seemed to 
learn more from the Balkan and Greek migrants, with whom they also interacted due 
to their commonality of Ottoman hegemony. Like the Balkan and Greek literature, 
Syrian literature also depicted the Ottoman sultanate as oppressive, in attempts to 
construct a separate Syrian nation. They also faced the same xenophobia, often being 
clumped together as “dagos” in the diaspora because of their similar attributes.
The modernizing national fervor was widespread throughout the various 
diasporic sites during the early half of the twentieth century, as Irish diasporic peoples 
called for an Ireland for the Irish, free from British oppression, and the “Black 
International” called for an “Africa for Africans”, embodied by Garvey and the Black
28 See Malcolm Campbell, Ireland's N ew  Worlds: Immigrants, Politics, and Society in the United States 
and Australia, 1815-1922  (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007).
29 Ibid, 20
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Star Ship Line.30 The Jewish diaspora called for a Jewish homeland in reaction to the 
anti-Semitism in Europe, which eventually took shape in the Belfour Declaration in 
1917 to create that Jewish homeland in Palestine.31 It was common among diasporic 
people during this era to view themselves as ‘liberators’ while they attempted to free 
their ancestral homelands from the grips of colonialism and enlighten current 
inhabitants. Immigrant diasporic peoples all used newspapers and literature to help 
foster their imagined community and move these nationalistic ideals forward.32
Scholars such as Benedict Anderson have questioned the construction of 
nationalism in diasporic communities, due to its complexity with emigration patterns. 
Anderson coins the word “long-distance nationalism” to describe nationalism 
phenomena in diasporic communities. However, Anderson questions the diasporic
participation in national politics. He does not believe that the diasporic migrants are
\
true exiles awaiting for victories in the homeland. Instead, Anderson believes that their
30 For more information about Garveyism and the African Diaspora in the early 20th century see  Adam 
Ewing, Age o f Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass M ovem ent and Changed Global Black 
Politics(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Robert Trent, The Americans Are Coming! Dreams 
o f African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); 
Putnam, Radical Moves; Michael 0 . West, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins, From Toussaint 
to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age o f Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009); and James Campbell, Songs o f Zion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
31 For more about the Jewish Diaspora in the age of Nationalism see  Rebecca Kobra, Jewish Bialystok 
and Its Diaspora: The M odern Jewish Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Robert 
Levine, Tropical Diaspora: The Jewish Experience in Cuba (Tampa: University of Florida Press, 1993); 
Daniel J Elazar, and Peter Medding, Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies: Argentina, Australia, and  
South Africa (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983); Victor A. Mirelman, Jewish Buenos Aires 1890-1930:
In Search o f an Identity  (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990); Jeffrey Lesser, Welcoming the 
Undesirables (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
32 Although many of the diasporas overlap and influenced one another during this time, this thesis will 
focus primarily on the Syrian diasporic community Little Syria. It is important to be well aware that the 
sam e them es (maybe not specifically sectarianism, but fragmentation and national unity) occur in 
other diasporas at the sam e time, but analysis of the influences the diasporas had on one another in a 
diasporic site will have to be saved for a later project. This thesis is focused on the sectarian 
fragmentation and national unity in the Syrian mahjar of Little Syria, New York during this era of 
nationalism.
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voluntary emigration is proof of their detachment from the nation. He contends that 
although they may support their homeland’s political causes, long distance ethno- 
nationalists feel little attachment to homeland, paying no price for the long-distance 
politics. Anderson suggests that nationalist immigrants are “emigres who have no 
serious intention of going back home, which, as more time passes, more and more 
serves as a phantom bedrock for an embattled metropolitan ethnic identity.”33 The 
host-land becomes home for the migrants and long-distance nationalism is symbolic of 
a frozen imagined past.
Anderson may have been influenced by earlier diasporic historiography when 
writing about the symbolic nature of long-distance nationalism. Oscar Handlin’s The 
Uprooted: The Epic Story o f the Great Migrations that made the American People 
(1951) is considered the pioneering work of diasporic history. Handlin argues that 
migration was experienced as an alienation from family, community, and tradition. 
Handlin suggests that immigrants are uprooted from their culture and assimilated into 
their host countries, creating a melting pot. Many diasporic historians between the 
1950s and the 1980s, including Alixa Naff, Charlotte Erickson and Rowland Berthoff, 
followed Handlin’s path by focusing on the assimilation of diasporic groups.
Scholarship of the 1980s moved away from the melting pot theory of diasporic 
identities. In The Transplanted: A History o f Immigrants in Urban America (1987), 
John Bodnar refutes the notion that immigrants were uprooted from cultures of their 
homeland. Instead, Bodnar suggests that immigrants transplanted the cultural and
33 Benedict Anderson, "Long Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics" 
(paper presented at the Wertheim Lecture, CASA, University of Amsterdam, 1992), 12.
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political values of their homelands in host-societies. Since Bodnar’s ground-breaking 
work, historiography of the diaspora has analyzed conditions which prevented 
assimilation and allowed for long-distance nationalism to spread throughout 
immigrant communities. Khater argues that the returning migrants and the diasporic 
newspapers forged a middle class, constructed gender-roles, and modernized culture in 
the Lebanese region, as defined by middle-class America.34 I argue that Syrian 
migrants did not necessarily transplant the cultural and political values of their 
homelands, but reconstructed them in the form of sectarianism through print 
capitalism due to their experience in the mahjar.
Contrary to Anderson’s theory, the Syrian newspaper editors and their readers 
maintained feelings of attachment to the homeland in the diasporic communities. The 
editors paid the price for their visions of the emerging Syrian nation through lobbying 
efforts. The diasporic newspapers constructed a collective national identity to give 
voice to the community against the injustices they experienced in the mahjar and 
protect themselves from foreign threat. Hani Bawardi refutes Anderson’s theory when 
he analyzes the Syrian political organizations the migrants constructed and their calls 
for a separate Syrian nation. The immigrants were very involved in the political 
atmosphere in Syria, forming organizations to push for Syrian independence. The 
nationalist fervor was apparent in the mahjar, which shows the triumph of a Syrian
34 Akram Fouad Khater, Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the M iddle Class in Lebanon, 1870- 
1920  (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), 90
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national identity to unite the colonies.35 Not only were the migrants involved in Syrian 
politics, but they also were involved in the modernization project of the Syrian nation.
Bawardi urges his audience not to exaggerate the presence of sectarianism 
among the immigrants because the political organizations showed a union of Syrians 
of all sects with a nationalist goal. However the Syrian migrants who subscribed to 
these newspapers based on their sectarian affiliation, and the literary elites who called 
upon the masses to put aside sectarian strife in favor of a united front would disagree. I 
contribute to this historiography by proving that sectarianism still persisted in the 
mahjar, reproducing itself in print-capitalism as the elite fought one another for 
influence. I will also show that the Syrian migrants did not only unite under a national 
identity in political organizations but also against domestic threats. Sectarianism was 
very much alive among the common immigrants, but the factions briefly united when 
presented with a foreign threat against the Syrian community.
To make this project feasible, this analysis concentrates on the events of Little 
Syria during this time. The community newspapers highlight the fragmentations of the
community. These sources show how the calls for national unity in the diaspora to
/
confront foreign influence in Syria. The newspapers will also show the provocations 
from other immigrants in Manhattan, which caused unity within the Syrian 
neighborhood to defend themselves as Syrians. The first section of this thesis covers a 
brief history of the sectarian tensions in the Ottoman Empire which led to the creation 
of an immigrant colony in New York, while also highlighting the divisions between
35 See Hani Bawardi, The M aking o f Arab Americans: From Syrian Nationalism to U.S. Citizenship. 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014).
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the immigrants in the mahjar. The original confrontations that the immigrants faced in 
their experience with the New York Police Department and the Irish-American 
immigrant communities in Manhattan to cause them to unite and forge a collective 
community, finalized by creating the first newspaper of the diaspora. The second 
section will cover 1900-1905, with the street riot being the apex of sectarian disputes. 
More newspapers were created during the first decade of the twentieth century, further 
fragmenting the community along sectarian lines.
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Ottoman Syria: Industrial Transformations 
The Ottoman Millet System and Religious Tolerance
Sectarian tensions have plagued Syria since the medieval era as sectarian 
groups splintered from Christian and Muslim groups and were persecuted as heretics. 
Wars erupted over which religious sect should have more political representation. 
During the Fourth Crusade, Roman Catholics laid siege to the Greek Orthodox 
Antioch Church in Constantinople, causing fights between the Maronites and the 
Greek Orthodox peoples in Syria. Yet, the first wave of mass emigration from the 
Syrian did not occur until after I860.36
The Ottoman Empire was vastly diverse in its ethnic and religious 
composition; Ottoman Christian and Jews were protected under Islamic law as dhimmi 
communities. The poly-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman subjects worked and 
worshipped side by side. Persecution based upon religious convictions were very rare, 
but tolerance of religion did not necessarily cause an egalitarian society. The dhimmi 
people were treated as second-class citizens in Ottoman society, in order to recognize 
the primacy of Islam. To successfully accommodate their diverse religious subjects 
and maintain their loyalty, the Ottomans gave dhimmi communities sufficient
36 The brief history of the sects begin with the Council of Chalcedon, which led the Syriac Orthodox 
from the Chalcedonians in 451 and violence betw een the tw o sects. The Syrian Orthodox accepted a 
non-Chalcedonian, Severus, as Patriarch and relied more on Constantinople under the Byzantine rite. 
The Greek Orthodox Church seceded from the Holy Roman Catholic Church in 1054. In 1724 Cyril VI 
was elected the Greek Patriarch of Antioch, and he led the split from the Greek Orthodox Church of 
Antioch, as the Melkite Greek Catholic Church, welcom ed back into the communion of the Roman 
Catholic Church. The Maronite Catholics is a different rite from the Roman Catholic Church, who took  
their name from their first church, Reesh Moran (head of our lord). For more information about the  
history of late antiquity sectarian conflicts among Christians see  Menz Volker-Lorenz, Justinian and the 
making o f the Syrian Orthodox Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). During the fourth 
crusade Catholics sacked Greek Orthodox towns in 1203. For more information about the fourth 
crusade see  John Julius Norwich, Byzantium: The Decline and Fall (London: Folio Society, 2003).
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opportunities to become economic stakeholders in the empire. Although they were 
restricted in status, the dhimmi became the backbone of the Ottoman financial and 
diplomatic administration. For instance, wealthy Phanariote Greek Orthodox Christian 
families controlled the revenue produced by Moldavia and Wallachia, shaped Ottoman 
foreign policy, and administered the Aegean islands.
The millet system was implemented by the Ottoman Empire to keep their 
religious minorities loyal to the sultanate by granting their religious communities “a 
degree of legal autonomy and authority with the acquiescence of the Ottoman state.”37 
The patriarch of each millet community was responsible for the community’s taxes in 
exchange for state recognition of autonomy. However, the millet system was unevenly 
enforced throughout the Ottoman Empire, supporting only larger minority religious 
communities. Smaller religious communities, like Jews, Maronite Catholics, and 
Armenian Christians, did not have sufficient ecclesiastical centers to meet their needs 
and traditions. Smaller religious communities resented the Greek Orthodox Christians 
for their special privileges and prosperity under the Ottoman millet system. The 
Maronites were one of the groups who resented the Greek Orthodox. Their resentment 
strengthened over the years, transpiring in the Syrian diaspora in the nineteenth 
century. Animosity between the two sects was witnessed in Little Syria as members of 
the Maronite elite attacked a Greek Orthodox bishop, causing a riot in the Manhattan 
neighborhood.
37 Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottom an Empire: The Functioning o f  
a Plural Society (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 12-13.
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The Maronite resentment of the Greek Orthodox was due to their minority 
status in the Ottoman Empire. The Maronite Church in the Mount Lebanon region 
were forced to seek investiture from the pope rather than the Sultan, because the 
Ottomans were not interested in this small religious community. Due to the weakness 
and disorganization of the Maronite church, their political affiliations to the muqati j i , 
or the fief holder/chief, and amir in the Mount Lebanon region cut across sectarian 
lines.38 The community of Druze, Maronites, Nusayri-Alawites, Nizari-Ismailis, and 
Shiites shared the same political affiliation of the chief of the region, which was 
usually a Sunni Muslim. Notable families in Mount Lebanon dominated to role of the 
chief of the region, like the Shihabi, Khazin, M a’ni and Jumblatt families. The Shihabi 
family ruled during the second half of the eighteenth century and united the different 
religious communities in Mount Lebanon for almost a century.39 These communities 
were religiously fluid, the Shihabi family was predominantly Sunni. However, some 
branches of the Shihabi family converted to the Maronite faith or the Druze faith. 
Sectarian lines hardened throughout the nineteenth century during Ottoman economic 
downturns and political transitions. The Maronite Church was also restructured with 
Papal financing and strengthened during this period. As it strengthened, the Maronite 
clergy sought political dominance in Mount Lebanon.
The relative autonomy and freedoms dhimmi societies received under 
Ottoman rule were not constant. In times of turmoil and economic downturn,
38 The muqati'ji also collected taxes from their diverse community
39 See Iliya F. Hakik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, 1711-1845  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968). The union among the sects under Shihabi rule fell in 1841 when Amir Bashir 
Mulhim Shihab (Bashir III) alienated his Druze subjects by allying with Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt, 
when Egypt occupied the region.
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prosperous dhimmi subjects were attacked with stricter restrictions. It was common 
for the Ottoman administrations to increase the jizaya head tax when there was an 
economic downturn, but they increased all taxes for all the peasants at the same time.40 
Sometimes old restrictions were resurrected due to the belief that Ottoman laxity and 
moral corruption led to the economic downturn of the Empire. Sometimes non- 
Muslims were tricked into converting due to jealousy of economic success during 
these economic downturns 41 Economic downturns followed the wars of the eighteenth 
century, when the Ottoman Empire realized the limits of its expansionist rule and 
began losing territories in the Balkans and Crimea. The Ottoman Empire had to 
modernize its military, economy, and political sectors in face of these defeats. The 
cavalry was replaced with an expanded janissary, which now included Ottoman 
Muslim peasants. Extraordinary taxes, or avariz, was made regular to fund wars, and 
tax-farming replaced the old feudal system. Tax-farming allowed for the emergence of 
the notable families in Syria and the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire, blurring 
the lines between the peasantry and the nobility.
Industrialization and Foreign Influence
Old restrictions and religious tensions resurfaced in the nineteenth century as 
the Ottoman economy was transformed by the spread of capitalism and 
industrialization. International trade increased sixty-five fold. Industrialized Western 
countries aggressively penetrated the Ottoman economy, transforming transportation
40 The jizaya head tax was taxes reserved for dhimmi protection in lieu of conscription into the 
Ottoman Army.
41 For more about forced conversions see  Tijana Kristie, Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives o f  
Religious Change in the Early M odern Ottom an Empire (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
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and Ottoman politics. In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt and Syria to 
dominate Eastern trade. Bonaparte also hoped attack British commerce by 
undermining British access to India. The Ottomans reconquered Egypt with the help of 
the British. In exchange, the British received capitulations which allowed the British 
to flood Ottoman markets with British exports. Domestic commodities such as 
Mediterranean sugar, mocha coffee, and Indian dye were replaced by cheaper 
European colonial commodities. European colonial products were made cheaper 
through slave labor and advanced mechanization, yielding greater production. By 
1840 British cotton replaced Indian cotton due to the labor saving mechanisms of the 
spinning jenny, water frame, and the Samuel Crompton’s mule.42 These inventions 
allowed for good quality yam at competitive prices. Western countries financed 
railroads and steamships in the Ottoman Empire to increase the availability of their 
commodities in Ottoman markets. Traditional commercial centers were displaced by 
deep-water port cities, like Beirut. The improvement of transportation and 
communications in the Ottoman Empire led to population growth. European financiers 
began opening silk factories in Syria in response for the increasing French demand for 
silk thread. Growing number of women and children were incorporated into the 
manufacturing work force while traditional guilds decreased in strength. The shift to 
unskilled and unorganized labor financed by Western Europeans depressed wages and
42 Halil Inalcik, "When and how British cotton goods invaded the Levant Markets," in The O ttom an  
Empire and the World-Economy, ed. Huri Islamoglu- Inan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 377.
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increased inflation. The transition of a ‘modernized’ Levant commenced, as gender 
roles and family structures were reconfigured in face of industrialization.43
In the 1830s Muhammad Ali Pasha declared Egypt independent from the 
Ottoman Empire and invaded Syria. To protect their Ottoman and Indian markets, 
France, Britain, and Russia assisted the Ottomans in reconquering Syrian territory. To 
further punish Muhammad Ali Pasha, Sultan Mahmut II held a trade convention with 
Great Britain in 1838. Under the Anglo-Turkish Convention, Sultan Mahmut II 
granted the British equal economic rights to other foreign nations. The capitulations 
agreed upon were made permanent, allowing the British to buy Ottoman products and 
resell with limited duty-cost. European merchants extended their advantageous 
capitulations to Ottoman Christians through berat certifications. Berat certifications 
gave Christians tax exemptions. Although the Anglo-Turk Convention was meant to 
hurt Muhammad Ali Pasha, it displaced Muslim merchants and Ottoman industrial 
workers.
The Ottoman economy plummeted after the Crimean War, allowing greater 
European intervention. To fund the Crimean War in 1853, the Ottoman Sultanate 
obtained high-interest European loans to strengthen and modernize their military 
technology. The frantic effort by the Ottomans to modernize their military was not 
enough to stop Russia from defeating them. When the Ottomans lost the Crimean War, 
their economy plummeted and they defaulted on their loans. Defaulting on the loans 
allowed foreign lenders to directly penetrate the Ottoman economy to o protect their
43 For more about the modernization of Lebanon and the formation of gender and the middle class, 
see  Akram Khater, Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the M iddle Class in Lebanon, 1870-1920  
(Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2001)
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foreign investments. European powers directly collected taxes on certain commodities 
like tobacco and silk. Modem European financial institutions were constructed to 
collect taxes for European lenders. The European collection of Ottoman taxes 
continued until the nation-state of Turkey finally repaid the European lenders in 1923. 
In the meantime, European control of taxation and its ability to recover loans 
encouraged further foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire.
In Mount Lebanon, foreign capital took its shape in the growing silk industry. 
For centuries, sericulture, or the raising of silkworms, had been a component to the 
Mountain’s economy, along with olives, wheat, and grapes. The mountains became 
the site of economic opportunities by 1711. Silk made in the mountains were 
demanded inland to sell to the European merchants. This left less land for peasants to 
farm crops and wheat, so they relied on grain from inland Syria and Egypt.44 This 
delicate economic balance crashed in 1838 after the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
Sultan Mahmud of Ottoman Empire made treaties with Great Britain, France, Russia 
and Austria to abolish local monopolies and protectionist trade for European 
merchants, in order to hurt the Egyptian economy.45 This made European goods 
cheaper than the goods produced in Syria, which hurt the Syrian agricultural sector, 
but allowed the silk sector to prosper. The inhabitants of Mount Lebanon came to rely 
on the European market for livelihood. The Lebanese economy transformed into an 
export-economy, existing on the whim of the demand for silk. To curb European
44 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: O ttom an Lebanon, 1861-1920  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), 20.
45 Mohamed Ali Pasha was the ruler of Egypt at this time and was the sultan's bitter adversary. He had 
economic connections with France and Great Britain, but offering the same treaties would cause his 
economic policy to collapse. He relaxed his tariffs to  appease these powers.
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influence and modernize the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdulme^d passed the Edict of 
Giilhane in 1839, which abolished tax farming, imposed universal military 
conscription and secularize law to eliminate the millet system. The edict also allowed 
for the reform of Ottoman educational, financial, and bureaucratic infrastructures. In 
1856, the Ottoman government passed the Hatt-i Humayun or the Imperial Reform 
Edict to promise freedom of religion. These reforms abolished the millet system and 
gave Ottoman Christians greater rights, allowing them to become civil servants and 
rise politically. Ussamma Makdisi argues that these edicts led to competition between 
the Ottoman Empire and foreign powers over the loyalty of the sects in the Syrian 
province, allowing the sects greater political power.46 Increased power for the 
sectarian groups allowed for intrasectarian competition to attempt to monopolize their 
political power over the other sects, a trend which migrants eventually took with them 
throughout the diaspora.
Foreign intervention and inflation caused by the capitulations and reform 
edicts led to sectarian tensions against the Ottoman Christian benefactors. Maronite 
peasants in Mount Lebanon were able to prosper and buy honorary titles. Maronite 
peasants vied for greater political power. Khater suggests that the emergence of the 
silk-export economy led to the making of the middle class in Lebanon.47 Sectarian 
strife in the Mount Lebanon region was inter-sectarian until these political aspirations 
pitted Maronites against their Druze neighbors in Mount Lebanon, eventually leading 
to mass migrations. Sectarian tensions between the Druze and the Maronites brewed
46 Ussama Makdisi, "Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in Nineteenth- 
Century Ottoman Lebanon" Comparative Studies in Society and History 42 (2000).
47 Khater, 21
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for about forty years prior to the 1860 massacres. Both the Druze and Maronites vied 
for political dominance in the Lebanese mountains and disputed over land and harsh 
tax-farming tenancy regulations.48 The Druze were considered Muslim brethren of 
sorts, because the Druze sect was a sect of Twelver Shi’a Islam. This sect was 
tolerated by the Ottoman Empire, which promoted Muslim interests above those of 
their dhimmi subjects. Druze inhabitants did not have to pay the jizaya tax and were 
treated preferentially due to their Islamic beliefs. When additional taxes were imposed 
by Abdullah Pasha, the Akka governor, in the 1820s, skirmishes erupted along the 
mountains. The Maronites felt that the tax distribution was unequal. Druze landlords 
appeared to be favored over Maronite tenants. Maronites believed that they suffered 
from overburdening taxation and resented the preferential treatment towards their 
Druze landlords, and they imported this mentality to the. However, Ottoman 
preferential treatment towards Druze did not prevent Maronites from becoming 
successful, nor did it prevent peaceful neighborly relations with the Druze prior to the 
nineteenth century. The class struggle assumed a sectarian coloring as European 
governments became more involved in Mount Lebanon’s economy. Maronites 
remembered their treatment and unfair taxation as proof of Ottoman oppression. The 
collective memory of Ottoman oppression and European salvation remained with 
Maronites even years after migrants settled in other countries. In Little Syria, 
Maronites justified their migration by blaming Ottoman oppression, as they did 
throughout Europe.
48 For more about early relations betw een the Druze and the Maronites see  Iliya F. Hakik, Politics and  
Change in a Traditional Society, 1711-1845. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
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The combination of harsh Ottoman and Druze taxation to fund the reform 
projects and resentment of privileges caused sectarian solidarities and clashes in the 
mountains. The Europeans were seen as allies with the Christians due to European 
extension of berat certificates to Christian merchants; thus Muslim merchants 
bankrupted by European commercialization were resentful of the Christian Syrians. 
After the French invaded the Mount Lebanon silk economy, the French Consulate 
influenced regional politics. The French Consulate would only consult with Maronites, 
so the Maronite Church was able to gain a central role in the politics of Mount 
Lebanon. The Church’s new political role created a new sphere of political life beyond 
the Amir and chiefs. The Druze resented French intervention in regional politics. In 
reaction, many Druze landlords in the mountains imposed harsh conditions for their 
Maronite tax-farmers. The Maronite Church and French Consulate became more 
active in defending its constituents. Meanwhile, Druze kinsmen rallied together to 
defend themselves, financed by the British Consulate. The tension in the region 
escalated to civil war in 1860. The 1860 massacres were the most brutal sectarian 
confrontations in the mountains to date, embedded in the minds of the immigrants who 
sought emigration to escape these violent confrontations. Inhabitants of Little Syria 
retold the horrors of the 1860 Massacres to justify their emigration from the 
oppressive Ottoman Empire.
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Sectarian Tensions Erupt: The 1860 Massacres
The most immediate cause of the 1860 massacres was a dispute between a 
Druze boy and a Maronite boy in Beit Miri in August 29th, 1859.49 The parents of the 
children disputed over parenting skills and respect. Feeling threatened, the Maronite 
inhabitants of Bayt Miri recruited Maronite kinsmen from neighboring villages. They 
took up arms against their Druze neighbors the following day. On August 30th 1859, 
the skirmish more Druze than Maronites were killed. That winter, the Druze planned 
their revenge. Using British funding, the Druze chiefs secured arms through Khurshid 
Pasha of Beirut and rose in April of 1860. The massacres spread throughout the Syrian 
province and lasted until July 1860.
These massacres erupted along the coast of Greater Syria: from Kisrawan to 
Damascus, leaving 360 villages and 560 churches burnt to ashes. While many lost 
their homes, Syrians realized the necessity of emigration to escape this oppression and 
violence. British Consul of Damascus, Colonel Charles H. Churchill, lived in 
Bahwwarah at the time. As an eyewitness to the massacres in Syria, Churchill 
described brutal scenes from the massacres in his diary:
"The Druzes rushed upon them sword in hand, and cut down every man they m et. The 
women and children fled  in dire consternation. With a wild cry of despair the whole 
population hurried down the nearest ravine,' leaving their village behind them already in
49 The dispute betw een the children is questionable. Missionary Henry Jessup details it in his memoirs, 
claiming that the dispute was over a chicken. See Henry Jessup, Fifty-Three Years in Syria (New York: 
Fleming H. Revell Co, 1910), 170. Philip Hitti believed it to  be a common "brawl" which can be 
presumed as a wrestling match; See Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 
1962), 437. However, Beiruti children in the 1970s w ere taught it erupted after a dispute betw een  
children over a game of marbles. Samar Sakr, in discussion with the author, October 2014.
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flames. Twelve hundred men were m assacred over the space of tw o miles, so rapid had been 
the pursuit. Many took shelter in caves and holes in rocks, where they remained for days in a 
sta te  o f starvation... upwards of 300 bodies strew ed and the sea-beach and the gardens 
round about. The shrieks of the women and children rent the air."so
This scene occurred in May of 1860 along the route to Sidon, as Christians fled 
their villages to save themselves from Druze rage. Meanwhile, Druze soldiers laid 
siege to Deir al Qammar for twenty-two days, against the Maronites who had fled their 
homes. Maronite homes were torched and turned to ashes. Unsuspecting Maronites 
were ambushed by the Druze soldiers and tom apart, limb-by-limb. Maronites fled for 
their lives and sought refuge in the Deir al Qamar, the site of an important Maronite 
Church, Saidat al Talle (Lady of the H ill).51 The city had barracks to protect the 
Maronites, but the Druze broke through the barracks and laid siege to the city. Two 
thousand Christians were massacred, as the Dmze burned down the city. In total, the 
highest estimate of Christians that were killed during the 1860 massacre in Greater 
Syria reached 20,000.52
The sectarian war of 1860 did not escalate into a religious war, but it did affect 
other sects beyond the Dmze and the Maronites. Although only the Maronites were in 
conflict with their Dmze neighbors, Maronites were not the only Christians targeted in 
1860; the Greek Orthodox community in Wadi al-Taim did not escape the rage of the
50 Charles H. Churchill, The Druzes and the M aronites: Under the Turkish Rule fro m  1840 to 1860  
(London: Bernard Quaritch, 1862), 156-157. Colonel Churchill was an eye witness to  this event; he 
spent the past tw enty years living in Bahawwarah, Syria as a British consul.
51 Located in South W est Modern Day Lebanon. Translation of the city's name is Monastery of the 
Moon. The city has a long religious and political history,
“ Philip and Joseph Kayal, The Syrian Lebanese in America: A Study in Religion and Assimilation 
(Boston: Twayne, 1975).
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Dmze Syrians. On the other hand, few Sunni and Shi’a Muslims joined the Dmze. The 
Maronites saw this incident as Ottoman persecution because the Ottoman soldiers did 
nothing to stop the Dmze militia. In fact, some Ottoman soldiers lured Maronites into 
an ambush, by offering Christians asylum in order to disarm them.53 Khurshid Pasha 
was blamed for supplying the Dmze with arms, and the Turkish irregular cavalry was 
reported by Churchill to have “joined vigorously in the pursuit” of the Christians and 
raping Christian women.54
Maronite migrants throughout the Diaspora retold the horrific events of the 
Massacre as proof of Ottoman persecution against them. Although they had not lived 
it, memories of the Massacre passed from parents and neighbors to the migrants, who 
retold the tale of loss and persecution in the Diaspora. In fact, the Ottoman consul in 
Barcelona in 1889, Yusuf Bey, reported his embarrassment of the Lebanese Maronite 
migrants who dressed in rags telling stories of Ottomans massacring their wives and 
children.55 Arsan argues that Syrian migrants were not above manipulating their 
position as Eastern Christians “to play upon the piety and pity” of natives in their 
adopted homelands.56 However, Syrian migrants who retold the stories of the 
massacres did believe that they were oppressed by the Ottoman Sultanate. Syrian 
migrants reported the history of Syrian Christian persecution to New York
53 Gregory Orfalea, The Arab Americans: A History (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2006), 58
54 Churchill, 145.
55 Engin Arkali, "Ottoman Attitudes towards Lebanese emigration, 1885-1910" in Arsan, Interlopers , 
29.
56 Arsan, 29.
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newspapers, to give reasons why they migrated and why Syria should become a 
separate nation-state from the oppressive Turkish Empire.57
Although Syrian Christians felt as though the Ottomans did nothing to stop 
their persecution, the actions of the Druze and the Ottoman soldiers who aided them 
did not go unpunished. The French Consulate, British Consulate, Russian Consulate 
and the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Druze authorities clamored against their 
injustices. To pacify them, Ottoman Foreign Minister Fouad Pasha blamed Ottoman 
officers for failing to prevent the attacks and punished them severely. Furthermore, 
forty-eight Druze leaders were condemned to death, twenty-four imprisoned and 249 
exiled.58 Some of these punishments were not executed because sentenced Druze 
chieftains fled the mountain. Many Druze migrated south to Houran, Syria. The 
Maronite Church was left as the most powerful institution in Mount Lebanon. To 
monopolize its influence, the Maronite Church built schools, hospitals, and 
monopolized the land to render services to the inhabitants.
The Ottomans joined Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 
creating a special Ottoman govemorate, mutasarifiyya, in Mount Lebanon under the 
leadership of a Maronite governor. The mutasarifiyya officially ended the previous 
rule of a local Amir and created a confessional government in Mount Lebanon. The 
Reglement required that the Administrative Council and the judicial system of Mount 
Lebanon have councilors and justices to represent each sect in Mount Lebanon, 
elected by the majority leader of each province. Maronites made up the majority of
57 '"Young Syria Holds a Meeting: An Open Air Demonstration to Aid Their Cause for Freedom" The 
N ew  York Daily Tribune, August 11 ,1899 .
58 Hitti, Lebanon, 440
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most of the Lebanese provinces. Thus, sectarian leaders amiable to the Maronite 
Church were elected. While the Maronite Church increased in political dominance, 
more Druze inhabitants of Mount Lebanon migrated to Houran. Houran was renamed 
Jabal al- Druze, or the Druze mountains to accommodate for the growing population 
of migrants. Many of the Druze landowners in Shuf were forced to sell their lands to 
Maronites during Franko Pasha’s governorship of the mutasarifiyya.59 The Druze’s 
influence in the mountain had been forcibly replaced by the Maronite Church and the 
French consulate. The Druze who could become elected to administrative had to be 
amicable to the Church, thereby increasing Church influence. After Franko’s 
governorship of the Mountain in 1873, governors tried to weaken the Maronite Church 
without success. The Sublime Porte feared another civil war in the Syrian province 
because they did not want further European aggression into Syrian economy and 
politics.
While Ottoman governors were appointed to check the power of the Council, 
the Porte checked the power of the governors. As the governors pushed reforms to 
weaken the domination of the Maronite Church, the Porte prevented the governors 
from interfering in Lebanese politics, for fear of further foreign aggression. For the 
next fifty years, the Porte maintained a policy of peace in Mount Lebanon using its 
personal treasury. The Administrative Council vetoed every measure of increasing 
taxation and invoked Porte to repay tax deficits. The Porte’s peace policy allowed an 
autonomous Lebanese government to develop.
59 Akarli, Long Peace, 53. Franko Pasha was renowned for his alliance with the Maronite Church.
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The 1860 Massacre was the immediate cause of a new Ottoman govemorate. 
The restoration of stability and peace in the wake of the Massacre gave European 
capitalists greater access to the Levantine markets, in a time where the demand of silk 
increased due to the decrease of American cotton during the American Civil War. The 
massacres also provoked Syrian migration to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. With 
the horrors of the massacres fresh on their minds, Syrian Christians boarded boats to 
escape the sectarian conflict and created the first mahjar site in Egypt. Egypt had 
economic ties to Greater Syria since the eighteenth century. After the construction of 
the Suez Canal, Egypt promised economic opportunities for migrants. Sectarian 
tension increased as politics began to depend on sectarian representation in the 
mutasarifiyya, so Druze and Greek Orthodox inhabitants decided to migrate to escape.
There were other causes in the nineteenth century that paved the way for
Syrian emigration, such as the decline in economic opportunities in the Greater Syrian
area. When the Suez Canal opened in 1869, the silk market faced competition with
cheaper Far Eastern silk. Depression in silk prices affected Levantine markets, since
forty percent of the Mountain’s population earned a living through the silk trade. The
transformations in the Ottoman financial infrastructure were mirrored in political and 
0
legal infrastructure as the Sultanate sought reforms to industrialize and modernize.
The increase in reforms were aggravated by foreign powers who invested in their 
Ottoman markets. Modernization created social displacement and discontent during 
the transition of traditional infrastructures to modem ones. Families were displaced as 
the family economies declined, reconstmcting social values and constructing a modem
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notion of gender.60 The uprooting of traditional structures encouraged Syrian peasants 
to seek education and to progress in the industrialized world. Many decided to migrate 
to European countries to seek a modem education.
60 For more information see  Judith E. Tucker, "Decline of the Family Economy in Mid-Nineteenth 
Century Egypt" in The M odern M iddle East, ed. Albert Hourani et al. (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1993).
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America: The Land of Opportunity
The United States was not an initial destination for Syrian emigrants because 
the American Civil War was underway at this time. Also, the United States was not 
yet an economic world power. The American Civil War and the decrease of American 
cotton in international markets created a greater demand for Lebanese silk in Europe, 
actually strengthening the economy in Mount Lebanon. After the Massacre of 1860, 
the Syrian silk industry soared as European powers forced their way into the economy 
and politics. The mutasarifiyya created by the Reglement of 1861, allowed for greater 
European interventions into the Mount Lebanon inexpensive labor market. Article X 
of the Reglement stated that “all commercial litigation in the Mountain under the 
jurisdiction of the Ottoman Commercial Tribunal in Beirut.”61 The tribunal was 
constituted of European and Maronite merchants who held berat certificates 
exempting them from duties.
Article X allowed for European monopolization of the Lebanese economy. The 
direct degree of control European investors had made the region attractive for 
European investments. European financiers invested in the improvement of Syrian 
transportation technology. Connecting the mountains to the deep-water port cities 
allowed for bigger, quicker, cheaper and more regular shipments of silk. The road 
system increased three-fold between 1851 and 1912. European-financed steamboats 
reduced freight costs by twenty-five percent. Europeans also financed Lebanese 
‘owned’ silk factories in Lebanon to guarantee themselves yearly supplies of silk
61 John P. Spagnolo, France and Ottom an Lebanon: 1 8 6 1 -1 9 1 4  (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), 42.
41
thread and receive interest on their investments. By 1893 there were one hundred 
forty-nine silk factories in Mount Lebanon. The citizens of Mount Lebanon prospered, 
limiting migrations until the silk market collapsed in 1875. The prices for silk 
remained depressed after the Suez Canal had finished construction. The Suez Canal 
allowed for China and Japan to more feasibly join the world market and provide 
competitive prices for silk. The market depression combined with the population 
boom and lack of arable land in Syria encouraged Syrians to look towards the United 
States for economic amelioration.
By 1880, the United States had established itself as a desirable destination for 
quick riches for Syrian migrants who wished to ameliorate their financial situation as 
fertile land became scarce and population boomed. The early wave of Syrian 
migration prior to 1900 was a result of Syrian exposure to American missionaries and 
the world fairs in Philadelphia (1876) and in Chicago (1893). In 1866, American 
Presbyterian missionaries constructed the Syrian Protestant College, now known as 
American University of Beirut. Syrian notables sent their children to foreign schools 
to provide the best modem education, especially after their disillusionment with the 
decline of Ottoman education. The Presbyterian missionaries unintentionally 
encouraged Syrians to immigrate to the United States by describing the country as 
Christian-friendly. Given the collective memory of the 1860 massacres and sectarian 
tension, a wealthy Christian-friendly nation appeared ideal. The missionaries shared 
attractive American ideologies and showed photographs of the wealthy cities.62 
Syrians in the American missionary schools were taught grammar, algebra, geometry,
62Randa Kayyali, The Arab Americans. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 28-29.
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American geography, and Western notions of liberalism through secular texts. The 
missionaries also did humanitarian work and provided medical relief, which made the 
Americans appear to be hospitable and charitable people.63 Missionary teachings and 
tales of prosperity glorified the United States and prompted the earliest Syrian 
migrants to venture to New York.
The Syrian traders who travelled to the United States for the Philadelphia 
Centennial Exposition of 1876 also reported upon the display of American wealth. The 
news from the traders reinforced the promise of American prosperity throughout 
Syria, as silk prices depreciated. Many emigrated with the intention to make enough 
money to return home richer, like the Italian and Polish immigrants at the same time.64 
Syrian migrants were not economically, religiously, or politically displaced peasants, 
but were looking for financial amelioration. Migrants sent nineteen million dollars in 
remittances to their families in Syria in 1924.65 The news of these immigrants’ 
prosperity traveled back to Syria through kin and trade networks became more reliable 
reports. The regularity of remittances created the image of the United States as the 
land of opportunity and encouraged the first wave of Syrian immigration.
Najib Arbeely reminisced on the friendly interactions with the kind and 
generous Presbyterian missionaries in the first Arabic newspaper printed in Little
63 Alixa Naff, Becoming American and the Early Arab Im m igrant Experience (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1993), 35
64 For more about Polish migration patterns see Brian McCook, The Borders o f Integration: Polish 
M igrants in Germ any and the United States, 1870-1924  (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011). For 
more about the effects of return migration for the modernization of Italy see Linda Reeder, Widows in 
W hite: M igration  and the Transformation o f Rural Italian Women, Sicily, 1880-1920  (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003).
65 Charles Issawi, An Economic History o f the M iddle East and North Africa (London: Metheun & Co.
Ltd, 1982), 86.
43
Syria, Kawkab America. Arbeely describes the friendly interactions between Syrians 
and American Protestant missionaries and the hospitality shown to the Americans in 
Arbeen, Syria in the 1860s.66 Arbeely’s testimony to his American audience was an 
attempt to ease American unease and xenophobia against the new Syrian migrants. He 
created his newspaper, Kawkab America, to bridge the gap between Americans and 
Syrian migrants, and teach his readers the parallels of both cultures. Arbeely’s article 
is influenced by his personal experience with the missionaries sponsored by his 
family. Arbeely believes that the missionaries had the same interactions with other 
Syrian families in Arbeen, which impacted the migrant’s decisions to migrate to the 
United States.
Arbeely’s father, Joseph Arbeely, was a professor who taught the American 
Presbyterian missionaries Arabic.67 Joseph later described to the Public Ledger that he 
was forced to give the missionaries their Arabic lessons in secret at night, because the 
Ottoman government were hostile to missionaries.68 Joseph bought lands in his own 
name to allow the Presbyterian missionaries to build their churches. Joseph was 
disillusioned with the Ottoman Empire before the massacre because the authorities 
were blocking all foreign mission efforts. This disillusionment transformed into the 
decision to leave his homeland following the 1860 massacres, in which he survived by 
hiding himself in a secret room.69 As he watched Druze inhabitants bum down the
66 Najib Arbeely, "Local News" Kawkab America, April 15 ,1892 . Translated by the author.
67 In som e articles his name is spelled as Yusuf, which is the Arabic translation of Joseph. Since he 
seem ed to prefer the American spelling in the rest of the newspaper articles, I will stick with the 
Anglicized version of his name.
68 "Professor Arbeely: a Learned Christian Syrian and His Family Emigrate to Tennessee" Public Ledger, 
October 30 ,1883 .
69 Ibid.
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houses of his neighbors, Joseph Arbeely knew that he had to leave his village. Dressed 
in Druze garb, he escaped to the English Consul, who helped his entire family relocate 
to Beirut to teach at the Syrian Protestant College. Moving to Beirut was not enough 
for Joseph Arbeely, who was determined to leave the “retrograde civilization and a 
tyrannical government” of the Ottoman Empire for good.70 Joseph Arbeely used his
American connections to secure a teaching position in the United States and migrate.
■->
The Arbeely family’s connection with the American Presbyterian missionaries 
and their disillusionment with the Ottoman Empire prompted them to immigrate to the 
United States in 1878. Joseph “desired freedom of speech and action and education for 
[his] children.”71 The Arbeely residence in New York was short-lived. Joseph 
accepted a chair at the University of Tennessee in Maryville Blount County as 
Professor of Greek Theology and a professor of the Arabic language. However, Najib 
and Ibrahim returned to New York by the 1890s and created the first Arabic 
newspaper for the mahjar, Kawkab America.
The Arbeely family was considered to be the first Syrian family to immigrate, 
but not the only.72 The Arbeelys were the most prominent family, but many more 
Syrians migrated to the United States in pursuit of a better life in the 1880s. Syrians 
were impressed by the American Presbyterian missionaries and the news of success 
that the Arbeelys incurred in the United States. There were already nine hundred 
Syrians in the city when a reporter of the New York Tribune recorded his surprise at 
the ease the Syrian immigrants in Little Syria conversed with him in English in 1894.
70 N ew  York Daily Tribune, June 20 ,1881 .
71 Ibid
72 I b id
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It was implied that the Syrian immigrants had learned English prior to immigration, 
probably taught by the Presbyterian missionaries in Beirut’s “celebrated colleges.”73 
The missionaries had not only shown their students the promise of American liberty, 
but prepared them for migration by teaching them English. This article exemplifies the 
small, but significant, impact the missionaries had on the first wave of immigration.
The Presbyterian missionaries were not the only American connections to 
prompt the wave of Syrian immigrations. The United States’ first World Fair, the 1876 
Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, was attended by Ottoman-Syrian subjects. 
Syrian merchants displayed everything Ottoman; from coffee, to cotton, to relics from 
Jerusalem. These merchants returned to Syria with news of American economic 
prosperity and opportunities, displaying America as the one big “Souq al-Hamidiyah” 
or Damascus Bazaar.74 Souvenirs of the Philadelphia International Exposition were 
kept by Syrian merchants. Iskandar Kort was one of these merchants and he kept 
mementos, passing it down as an heirloom to his children, and is now in a family 
archive.75 Mementos from the Exposition were shown to relatives and neighbors to 
display the economic opportunities in the United States. The visual proofs further 
spread the promise of United States immigration. While merchants in the Centennial 
Exposition and the early immigrants continued to send back news of their experiences 
and success in the Americas, more families were prompted to immigrate to the United 
States, believing it to be the land of opportunity. News of the 1889 decision in to set a
73 "Colonists from Lebanon: Ways of Work and Living of the 900 Syrians in the City" The New York 
Tribune, April 2 2 ,1894.
74 Orfaela, 64.
75M em entos can be found in the Laila Kort Family Archive in Jerusalem.
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world fair in Chicago in 1893 encouraged more migration. Syrian immigrants began 
saving up to take a steamboat from Beirut port to London then to the United States. 
Syrian migration to the United States reached a high in 1891, as merchants moved 
down to prepare for the Chicago Exhibition of 1893.
The United States seemed much more favorable to the Syrians as the land of 
opportunity compared to the deteriorating conditions within the Ottoman Empire. It 
was promised to be a safe haven for Christians, who were disillusioned by the 
sectarian tensions and Ottoman decline. The Arbeely family and other Syrian migrants 
fled sectarian tensions in the Ottoman Empire. Many migrants were also hoping for 
financial amelioration. While Syrian migrants adopted new American identities, they 
retained their traditional sectarian identities. As the early immigrants settled in Little 
Syria, they pursued their old ways of life: keeping their distinct sectarian identities 
while trying to build their independent churches.
Xenophobia and the Creation of a Syrian Identity in the Mahjar
Syrian migrants did not necessarily consider themselves as “Syrian” until after 
the experience of migration and discrimination within their host countries. Identity and 
pride were based upon family names and sectarian affiliations in the Syrian province. 
The Syrian migrants were forced to superficially unite as a national group to survive. 
To unite the migrant community, the cosmopolitan elite members of the Syrian 
migrant community reproduced nationalist pride in their communities through cultural 
means. In the 1890s, physical attacks from neighboring Irish immigrants in 
Manhattan, New York led to the need for unity. In reaction to the Irish animosity and 
American neglect, members of the migrant’s elite created the first Syrian newspaper in
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neighborhood, although most shared the same Catholic belief. Stories of Irish 
immigrants filling stockings with flour to beat Syrians with it on Halloween are still 
remembered by Irish immigrants.78 The harassment the Syrian immigrants suffered at 
the hands of the Irish immigrants of Washington Street united them against these 
aggressors. New York newspapers only picked up on the most heinous of these 
incidents, usually resulting in hospitalization. The first article to describe one of these 
fatal incidents was in October of 1891, when an Irish trucker, Joseph Cunningham, 
tried to run a wagon off the road which contained two Syrians, Abdo Namnam and 
Habib Wahby. Cunningham swore at the two Syrians, then began severely beating 
Namnam. He “slashed Namnam across the face with his whip” then “pounded him 
severely, blackening his eye, and knocking him about the street.” When Wahby 
attempted to intercede to protect his assistant, Cunningham used a heavy oak cart-rung 
and hit Wahby with it, fracturing Wahby’s skull and killing him.79
There was no evidence of how the Syrian community felt about this incident, 
because there were no publications to show the Syrian side of the situation. The New 
York Daily Tribune and the authorities seemed to side with the Syrians as the Irish 
immigrants indiscriminately attacked them. The American public displayed the 
Syrians as a monolithic community without any sectarian divisions in this incident. 
The second fatal incident reported in the New York newspaper was met with a 
published reaction from the united Syrian community, who were appalled by the 
continuance of unrestrained harassment by the Irish community.
78 Ibid  page 85
79 "He Crushed in Wahby's Skull: The Fearful Force of the Blow Which a Driver Aimed With a Cart-Rung 
at a Syrian" N ew  York Daily Tribune, October 24, 1891.
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On April 5th, 1982 around five o ’clock in the afternoon, a Syrian teenager was 
walking down the intersection of Rector Street and Washington Street in New York. 
On the intersection, a drunken Irish immigrant yelled “Damn Syria!” and proclaimed 
that Washington Street was for Ireland. The Irish immigrant then knocked the Syrian 
immigrant on his back and began repeatedly punching him. Another Syrian immigrant 
was passing by when he witnessed this sight. The newcomer tried to defend the Syrian 
boy by prying the Irish man off of him. Events escalated quickly, as more Syrian and 
Irish immigrants heard their screams and attempted to help their “countrymen.” Badre 
Hallaby, a Syrian woman who lived on this intersection, ran out of her apartment to 
see what the commotion was about. Nellie Whalen, an Irish prostitute, attacked 
Hallaby with a brick, causing her hospitalization from near-fatal injuries. The street 
fight ended with black eyes, broken noses, and teeth loss.80
A group of Syrian immigrants went to the New York Police Department 
immediately after the skirmish. The group claimed that the Irish policemen were also 
drunk and let the Irish “ruffians go.” The Syrian immigrants demanded protection for 
all of the Syrian inhabitants of Washington Street. The Police Officers on duty, Flynn, 
Lyons, Carey and Campbell, claimed to have not seen the fight. Collee David, 
representing the Syrians, said that these policemen were drunk and let their 
countrymen go. The justice who listened to both sides and advised that “Syria and 
Ireland sign a treaty,” since it was clear that “Ireland arose and asserted herself’ while 
“Syria objected.81 The American public and the New York Police Department
80 Najib Arbeely, "Local News" Kawkab America, April 15 ,1892 . Translated by the author.
81 "A Woman Threw the Brick: First War Between Syrians and Irish- One of the Injured May Die" the  
Sun, April 5 ,1892 , 5.
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encouraged the maintenance of these nationalist identities as exemplified by the 
justice’s snarky remarks and the Sun 's title of the event: “The First War Between 
Syrians and Irish.” The national implication of this article shows how the divisions of 
the Syrian community faded away for the defense of the community and the Syrian 
country. The policemen who pretended not to see anything were also Irish, siding with 
the Irish immigrants, and led to an outrage in the Syrian community.
This incident did not receive an immediate published reaction by the Syrian 
immigrant public since the first Arabic newspaper was not published until April 15, 
1892. However, in their first issue of Kawkab America, the Arbeely brothers addressed 
these abuses by the Irish immigrants. The article presented the Syrian account of the 
events, through the words of Najib Arbeely. The article ended with an appeal for the 
Americans to treat the Syrian community with the same respect and hospitality that 
was given to the American missionaries in the Syria.82 The united Syrian community 
wanted protection against this “certain class of ruffians infesting the neighborhood,” 
from the police. Najib Arbeely claimed that Irish migrants tortured them with 
“molestations and persecutions that could hardly be expected from Barbarians.” The 
diction Arbeely utilizes to describe the events of the street fight and the attacks by the 
Irish migrants creates a juxtaposition between the disruptive monolithic Irish migrant 
community and the peaceful monolithic Syrian migrant community. Arbeely achieves 
the creation of a juxtaposition between the two communities by describing the Irish as 
worse than barbarians and how the Irish “thugs” are harassing a peaceful Syrian 
community, who had been nothing but friendly. The juxtaposition Arbeely creates was
82 Najib Arbeely, "Local News" Kowkab America, April 15 ,1892 . Translated by the author
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an attempt to present the civility and respectability of a monolithic Syrian migrant 
community in order to demand American protection.83 Arbeely finds it ironic that the 
American justice system would protect barbaric thugs rather than a peaceful 
community and highlights this irony within the first issue of Kawkab America. The 
publication of Kawkab America was a reaction to the injustices towards the whole 
Syrian community, while the barbarous Irish were protected by the American justice 
system.
Arbeely recognized that the injustice the Syrian migrants faced in New York 
was due to nativist anxiety toward new migration and industrialization. The American 
public believed that Syrians are uncivilized and dirty, unworthy of the American 
justice system. Thus, Arbeely utilized Kawkab America as a tool to reconcile 
xenophobia by running articles in English to teach the public about Syrians, since “it is 
an undoubted fact that the western man does not understand the oriental.” The 
newspaper attempted to reconcile the native’s anxiety by bridging the “wide gulf [that] 
has separated the nations of the East from those of the West,” or between Americans 
and Syrians. Arbeely’s publication of the newspaper was an attempt to prove to the 
American public that Syrian migrants were civilized and worthy of the American 
respect and protection via the justice system.84 The events of discrimination and lack 
of justice in the diaspora created the need for the Syrian migrants to unite to give voice 
to their imagined community and to quell Orientalist discrimination.
83 "Outrages on the Syrian Colony" Kawkab America, April 15 ,1892 .
84 "Introduction" Kawkab America, April 15 ,1892 .
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Kawkab America constructed a collective national Syrian identity in Little 
Syria, as the immigrants faced many challenges in the diaspora. The lived experience 
of these immigrants were contoured by discrimination and violence due to the 
prejudices fueled by Orientalism in the United States. It was necessary for the Syrians 
to unite under a collective national identity against the Irish “ruffians” and the 
American public who viewed them as uncivilized and unworthy of protection. Kawkab 
America became the tool to construct this united nationalist identity and voice the 
community’s concerns against the injustices it faced in the mahjar. The Arbeely 
brothers became the representatives of the Syrian migrant community in order to 
protect the community from foreign threats, giving rise to the cosmopolitan literary 
elite within the mahjar. The newspaper also kept Syrian migrants connected to their 
heritage and the events occurring in Ottoman Syria to maintain the connection of their 
ancestral homeland. In these incidents, sectarian attempts to rebuild and strengthen 
their sectarian churches/identities were set aside to unite as Syrians against thugs who 
attacked the community and prejudiced policemen who neglected their safety. 
However, the Syrian migrants were not unified under one national identity. They
continued to build and strengthen their respective churches, fragmenting their
/
community by reproducing sectarianism in the diaspora.
Reproducing Sectarianism in Little Syria
Until the 1890s, the Syrian immigrants did not have churches of their own, so 
they had to adopt existing churches near Little Syria to service their spiritual needs.
All of the Syrian Catholic immigrants, Maronites, Melkites, and Roman Catholics, 
attended services at St. Peter’s Church on Barclay Street. The Greek Orthodox Syrian
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migrants were scattered in different Russian and Greek Churches. This may appear 
that the earlier wave of immigrants united in common cause of adopting a church, but 
the immigrants maintained their sectarian and ritual distinctions in these American 
Churches. Hitti stated that “clannishness or factionalism is therefore the most 
pronounced feature of the Syrian character,” and not even migration would change 
this.85 Although they may have prayed in the same church as each other, the 
immigrants reconstructed their distinct services and their distinct identities in the 
mahjar.
In 1891, Syrian migrants highlighted their distinct identities and fragmentation 
to the American public through the media. This was first seen when the Sun published 
an article about the “three unusual masses” that took place at St. Peter’s Catholic 
Church. Instead of holding one service for all the Catholics, mass services were split 
up for each Catholic rite; at nine o’clock in the morning the Roman Catholics held 
their mass service, then the Maronites held their service at ten o’clock, proceeded by 
the Melkite mass at eleven o’clock. Apparently this arrangement with the Church was 
common for 1890, since Maronite migrants used the basement of St. Peter’s Church 
for their weekly Sunday services for the past year. The journalist distinguished the 
difference between the immigrant sects, describing the Melkites as 300 “dark-skinned 
and curiously attired” Syrians in this article, whereas the Maronites are identified 
simply as Maronites.86 The description of the two rites displays the stark differences in 
identity between the two sects as its members made it a point to clarify their
85 Hitti, The Syrians, 24
86 "The Unusual Masses: Roman Catholic, Syrian, and Maronite Services in One Day in St. Peter's 
Church" the Sun, January 7 ,1891 .
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differences to the journalist of the Sun. The Melkite immigrants described themselves 
as Syrian Catholics, probably shortened to “the Syrians” for this article, whereas the 
Maronite immigrants maintained their distinct identity. The Maronites maintained 
their distinct identity because of the political dominance of the Maronite Church in 
Mount Lebanon and Beirut. The strength of the Church gave them more confidence in 
their identities. Also, it is noticeable that neither of these sects indicate that they are 
Catholic, during a time of Catholic xenophobia in North Eastern Cities.
Although both the Melkite and Maronite sects had been holding services in St. 
Peter’s Church, they remained separated. Each sect refused to part with their rituals, 
forcing St. Peter’s Church to accommodate all three services in tight time slots until 
they could build their own churches. The Melkite community made St. Peter’s Church 
their own, led by the first Syrian priest who immigrated to Little Syria to lead the 
congregation in 1889. The Sun reported that the Maronite immigrants were already 
making plans of constructing a church on Rector Street, but they needed a leader to 
enforce these plans.
Before the Syrian immigrants could construct their own churches, they had to 
pave the way for their Syrian priests and bishops to migrate to New York and lead 
their individual sectarian communities. Father Peter Kurkamaz and Father Joseph 
Yazbek were summoned by the community in 1890 to create a Maronite congregation 
and make plans to construct the first Maronite church on Rector Street.87 Kurkamaz 
and Yazbek migrated to Little Syria in 1890, when the head of the Maronite
87 This church came to be called St. George's Church and it still stands on the intersection of Rector 
Street and Washington Street as one of the very few  remnants of Little Syria.
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community was commissioned to “minister to the spiritual wants of his countrymen in 
this city,” by uniting the Maronite immigrants under one congregation and church.88
The Greek Orthodox community attempted to unify under one congregation 
and church, but it did not take effect until 1895. Meanwhile, the Syrian Orthodox 
migrants had to choose between Greek and Russian churches in the diaspora, which 
divided the Syrian Orthodox community. There had been Syrian Greek Orthodox 
priests who tried to establish themselves as unifiers and leaders of the community in 
Little Syria prior to 1895, but the Syrian Orthodox migrant community could not 
support a permanent priest due to its relatively small size and lack of funds. The first 
Archimandrite, Constantine Tarazy, immigrated to New York in 1892 on his own 
initiative, but the community could not fund him nor build a church. Thus, Tarazy was 
forced to return to Damascus later that year.89 Another Archimandrite, Christopher 
Jabara, attempted to establish himself in Little Syria the following year and was able 
to establish a temporary church at the intersection of Cedar and Washington streets. 
Jabara’s failure at unifying the Syrian Greek Orthodox Community was due to a 
scandal he caused in the Archdiocese. He preached that Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam were all part of one religion and published these sermons in Unity in Faiths and 
Harmony in Religions: Based on the Ordinances o f the Old and New Testaments and 
the Koran. Jabara went too far when he gave an address at the Chicago Exposition of 
1893, in the Parliament of Religions, to spread this belief. He hoped to “remove all 
causes of dissensions and antagonisms between the professors of faith in the Bible, the
T
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Gospel and the Koran.”90 In an interview with the Sun in 1893, he argued that 
Christianity was the continuation of Judaism, and that Islam purified and fulfilled 
Christianity.91 These heretical views led to Jabara’s exile to Egypt.
Jabara’s episode could be seen as a radical attempt to unify the Syrian 
immigrant community beyond sectarian divide. Jabara may have also been trying to 
fight Western xenophobia, which at this time had manifested in anti-Semitism and 
Orientalism. Jabara was educated in Russia and was the head of the Antioch 
metochion in Moscow, which had been subject to anti-Semitist pogroms and 
islamophobia in the wake of the Crimean War. There he witnessed Western 
imperialism into Africa and the Ottoman Empire justified by religion. To cease further 
imperialist violence, Jabara advocated for a World Council of Churches. He explained 
how intertwined the three Abrahamic religions were, against the backdrop of religious 
genocide and exilic migrations. His views caused him to be exiled from Russia by the 
Metropolitan of Moscow. Jabara brought these views to Little Syria under his adopted 
title of Patriarch of Antioch in attempt to establish sectarian unity amongst Syrians and 
create the World Council of Churches, but Syrian immigrants rejected Jabara’s 
message after the humiliating episode in Chicago. Jabara’s rise exemplifies how the 
lack of established leadership in the small, dispersed Greek Orthodox Syrian 
immigrant community allowed for an obscure radical priest to rise through the ranks to 
leadership. If the congregation were larger and more concentrated, no priest deemed as
90 "Father Jibara of Syria: A Sojourner in the Syrian Colony of This City in Trouble with the Authorities 
of the Greek Church of Which He is an Archimandrite, Because of His Views- What He says of 
Christianity and Islam" The Sun, Septem ber 17 ,1893 .
91 Ibid
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a radical would have been able to establish himself as the leader o f the congregation. 
Jabara’s exile also shows the Syrian determination to maintain sectarianism in their 
adopted homeland, with their refusal to accept the notion that all religions run parallel 
to one another. After exiling Jabara, the Syrian Greek Orthodox community remained 
scattered and without a leader.
There would not be a centralized Greek Orthodox community until 1895, when 
Ibrahim Arbeely used his influence within the Orthodox Church to advocate for the 
appointment and migration of a strong Syrian Archimandrite educated in Moscow. 
Although the Arbeely family had much contact with the American Protestant 
missionaries, they never put aside their sectarian Greek Orthodox identity. Hitti says 
that this was common among Syrians who migrated because “the constituency of the 
churches is so fossilized [in Syria], and the conception of church membership as a 
social, or rather group affair, is so entrenched in the popular mind that no realignment 
could be achieved with any degree of facility or ease.”92 Ibrahim had become a doctor 
since immigrating to the United States and was elected President of the Benevolent 
Syrian Orthodox Society. Hearing of Archimandrite Raphael Hawaweeny’s 
achievements in Moscow, Ibrahim was impressed. Ibrahim wrote to Hawaweeny to
request his services in uniting and pastoring the Orthodox Syrian flock in Little Syria.
/
Members of the Benevolent Syrian Orthodox Society also wrote to Hawaweeny to 
request his services in the mahjar for a monthly salary of fifty dollars.93 Ibrahim also 
connected with the Russian Bishop of Alaska, who became interested in the growing
92 Hitti, The Syrians, 46
93 The Official Pronouncements 1.3 (1905), pp. 28-29, 45.
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Orthodox community in New York. At both Ibrahim and Bishop Nicholas’ requests 
for a Syrian Bishop for the United States, the Russian Emperor agreed to appoint 
Hawaweeny “to account for American churches and missions.”94
Hawaweeny was bom on November 20th, 1860, only months following the 
conclusion of the 1860 Massacre. His parents were from Damascus, but had sought 
refuge from the sectarian violence in Beirut, where Hawaweeny was bom. The 
Hawaweeny family and the Arbeely family and many others had sought refuge in 
Beimt during the conflict, but the Hawaweeny family returned to Damascus to raise 
their son. The conflict had greatly affected his family upon their return to Damascus, 
where his father was a merchant. In the late 1870s, Hawaweeny’s family was affected 
by the downturn of the economy and were unable to pay for his tuition. Due to his 
reputation in the parochial schools, Hawaweeny received sponsorship to study for 
priesthood. Ironically, Jabara had arranged for Hawaweeny to attend the Patriarchal 
seminary to study in Moscow. Hawaweeny actually replaced Jabara as the post of 
head of the Antiochian metochion in Moscow, foreshadowing his takeover in Little 
Syria.95
At the time of his appointment, he was teaching Arabic as a professor at the 
Kazan Theological Academy in Moscow. Before leaving Moscow in November, 
Hawaweeny gathered relics from Russia to furnish a new church in the mahjar. He 
found the Syrian Greek Orthodox community fragmented in Little Syria: some had
94 "Minister for Syrians: Christian Church to be Filled by a Damascus Preacher" The N ew  York Times, 
Septem ber 15 ,1895 .
95 For more information on Hawaweeny's life before immigrating to the United States see  Issa, "The 
Life of Raphael Hawaweeny."
59
neglected their religious duties and others had converted to other denominations.96 
Hawaweeny had much to do to pastor his flock under one congregation. He 
immediately went to work teaching, preaching, counseling, and constructing plans to 
create a new church and graveyard site for his congregation. Within two weeks of his 
arrival to Little Syria, Hawaweeny constructed and blessed a new chapel on 77 
Washington Street under St. Nicholas’ patronage. He also became chief of the 
Benevolent Society. To service his scattered congregation, Hawaweeny went on tours 
to visit smaller Syrian Orthodox communities scattered across the mahjar, performing 
marriages, baptisms, confessions, and celebrating Divine Liturgies. Meanwhile, he 
began compiling the necessary Syrian Orthodox liturgical prayers and services in a 
book called Al-taz ’ziyah al-haqiqiyyah f i  as-salawat al-ilahiyyah, Hawaweeny hoped 
that the book would strengthen the congregation and link the other communities to 
Little Syria. He also began looking for priests to service the smaller Greek Orthodox 
communities. Hawaweeny mended the fragmented Syrian Greek Orthodox 
Community in the American mahjar, first in New York and then throughout the North 
America. His efforts in the community and the fame he received threatened the 
Maronite community, which led to a street riot by 1905.
The main priority for the Syrian immigrants after they began settling in the 
mahjar was to rebuild their churches and create a united congregation under one 
church. Although at first glance it may have seemed like they set aside their sectarian 
differences to adapt to the United States, the immigrants remained divided by sect. 
They tried to emulate the land they left by rebuilding their communities. First they
96 Nikolas Nahas, a l-M ira t al Antakiyya f i  Am irka shimaliyya (Beaumont: Al-Hoda Press, 1922).
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petitioned for priests to lead their communities, to lead the construction of Syrian 
Churches in Little Syria to resemble the churches they left behind in Syria. The first 
Arabic newspaper for the mahjar had some sectarian connotations, as the Arbeelys 
sought to strengthen their Greek Orthodox community. Hitti claimed that this 
adherence to their sect and church was because the place of worship is where Syrians 
were educated; it was the center of their society, their protectorate, and their nation. 
Hitti states that the rebuilding of the churches in the diaspora is only natural because 
“the Syrians are loyal to their church because of the national aspect of its character, 
and it, therefore forms an integral part of the constitution of their community.”97
97 Hitti, The Syrians, 35.
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Sectarian Tensions along Washington Street 
Accommodating Chain Migrations
The second wave of Syrian migration began in the middle of the 1890s, when 
yearly recorded migrations were in the thousands.98 Syrians were encouraged to 
migrate to the United States as successful traders and shopkeepers returned to their 
villages to get married and/or to visit family. Returning migrants dressed lavishly and 
showed off substantial profits, inciting chain migrations to the United States. The 
Sultanate viewed mass migrations as evidence of discontent and worried about the 
Ottoman image abroad, especially since Syrian beggars in Paris spoke of Ottoman 
despotism and oppression against Christians. The Sultanate forbade emigration, thus 
creating a smuggling enterprise to accommodate the chain migration of Syrians. 
Smugglers cooperated with foreign maritime companies. Shipping agents, bond 
holders, brokers, muleteers, rowers, hostel keepers and merchants created an 
underground smuggling ring. Shipping lines employed brokers, who sent out agents to 
recruit immigrants.99 Diasporic newspaper articles in Cairo’s al- Muqtataf and 
Kawkab America also fostered chain migrations by describing benefits of American 
citizenship.100
The movements of the Syrian migrants were more controlled as the emigration 
business grew, usually deporting from Beirut to Marseilles. Hostels for Syrian 
migrants were set up in the ports of Athens, Barcelona, Liverpool, Genoa, Trieste,
98 Issawi, Economic History o f the M iddle East and North Africa, 86.
99 Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp, So Far From Allah, So Close to Mexico: M iddle Eastern Im m igrants in 
M odern Mexico  (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 52. 1
100 Aiixa Naff, Becoming American and the Early Arab Im m igrant Experience (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1993), 94.
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Cherbourg, and Le Hauvre, where tickets to North America and South America were 
sold. The hostel owners kept up with the news of economic opportunities to give 
advice on where to migrate. They sold the migrants initial trinkets to peddle in the 
United States.101 Some migrants were misrouted to South America and Africa. Others 
were turned away from the United States due to trachoma and were rerouted through 
South America to cross the border. As immigration to the United States increased, 
smuggling methods became more developed and professional.
To accommodate the growing numbers of Syrian migrants in the diaspora, 
more Syrian newspapers were established to represent the variety of migrants. The 
newspaper editors entered into competition with one another to gain influence in the 
diaspora. The second wave of migration saw a decrease in attempting to educate 
Americans about the Syrian migrants, as reality settled that the xenophobic 
discrimination would not cease. In 1897, trachoma was classified as a loathsome and 
contagious disease by the United States, fueling nativist backlash against migrants. 
Because of the high instances of trachoma among Syrian migrants, Syrians were 
considered dirty and diseased. In St. Louis they were called niggers; in Charleston 
they were called yellow. Other diasporic sites called them Turks, camel jockeys, and 
dagos.
Syrian and South Eastern European immigrants were blamed for the increase 
of poverty and criminality all over the diaspora.102 The way the immigrants dressed, 
ate, and decorated their homes were all scrutinized by nativists. By the turn of the
101 Andrew Arsan, Interlopers o f Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014),79
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63
twentieth century, Panama and Costa Rica excluded Syrians from migrating to their 
countries. In Haiti, Syrian storeowners were stoned on August 5th, 1905 and forcibly 
expelled from the island. On September 23rd, 1905, the Sun printed a letter to the 
editor from Reginald Williams where he calls the Syrian migrants undesirable in the 
civilization progress of the United States. Williams also says the undesirable 
foreigners the “degeneration of the native race” and that nothing would be more 
patriotic than to remove the Syrian immigrants from New York. His solution was to 
force the migration of the undesirable immigrants to the country side where they 
cannot degenerate the superior race.103 William’s letter is a prime example of 
xenophobia against the Syrian migrants. Acts of xenophobia alienated the Syrian 
population in Little Syria. They responded by turning inwards and focusing on the 
daily life of the Syrian community.
Early Diasporic Newspaper Conflicts
The Syrian migrants remained cognizant of the political debates in the 
Ottoman Empire through diasporic newspapers.104 To decrease competition, the 
newspapers targeted their fragmented Syrian audience by affiliating themselves with 
sectarian identities. The newspapers and the communities reflected the politics of 
Ottoman Syria and the mutasarifiyya in Mount Lebanon. Syrian inhabitants in the 
Ottoman Empire and throughout the diaspora were divided between the conservative 
and liberal politics, pro- and anti- Kusa politics, and Syrian-Arab nationalism versus
103 Reginald H. Williams, "The Birth Rate is the Explanation of Its Fluctuation Found in Economic 
Causes?" The Sun, September 23 ,1905 .
104 Arsan, 13
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Lebanese separatism. The pro-Kusa faction was considered to be a conservative 
stance, hoping for the Kusa family to remain in the governor position after N a’um 
Kusa’s governorship from 1892-1902. The Kusa family was allied with the Maronite 
Church and the foreign consulates. The anti-Kusa faction were liberal Maronites and 
Greek Orthodox Christians who challenged foreign interference in Mount Lebanon’s 
economy.
The pro-Kusa and anti-Kusa factions did agree upon separation from the 
Ottoman Empire, but the spread of nationalism manifested in different ways in Mount 
Lebanon. Mount Lebanon saw the fragmentation of its community over Lebanese 
separatism and Arab-Syrian nationalism. The Maronite Church constructed the theory 
of a separate Christian Lebanon by emphasizing its loyalty to France and underlining 
the differences between the Westernized Lebanese and the backwards ‘Arabs.’ The 
Maronite Church built a foundation for Lebanese nationalism. The Church used the 
atrocities of the 1860 massacres to advocate for French protection of Lebanese 
Catholics against the Ottoman Muslims. The Church and the mutasarifiyya also 
desired to expand their influence and incorporate Beirut and the Biqa’a Valley into 
Mount Lebanon. This desire was to receive more revenue for the government since 
Mount Lebanon’s own ports did not generate a significant sum. Inhabitants and 
migrants of the Syrian province did not necessarily agree with the Maronite Church’s 
political stance concerning Lebanon. Many in Little Syria called for a Syrian nation, 
protesting that there was peaceful coexistence in the region among the sects prior to
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foreign interference.105 These various views were all reflected in the sectarian papers 
in the diaspora.
As early as 1894, the sectarian affiliations of newspapers began as Al Asr was 
created by 27 year old N a’um Mokarzel and 28 year old Najib Maloof to rival Kawkab 
America. The latter did not have a sectarian affiliation, but was intended for the whole 
Syrian community. In Najib Maloof was a local silk merchant in Little Syria and a sort 
of a loan shark in the Syrian community. In 1894, Kawkab America published an 
article detailing how Maloof struck his neighbor, Habib Patrikian, for failing to repay 
his debts. The article reproached Maloof for his violence and encouraged Syrian 
migrants to handle disputes like Americans. Maloof sued the Arbeely brothers for 
libel, claiming that Kawkab America's article detailing M aloof s recent quarrels 
degraded his character, making him similar to “vagabonds, rogues and disturbers of 
the peace.” Furthermore, Maloof claimed that Arbeely slandered M aloof s name 
because he refused to recommend Kawkab America to Syrian migrants in the 
colony.106 Maloof said this to save his reputation and his business from the impacts of 
the article. To counter the influence of Kawkab America, he decided to create his own 
newspaper, al-Asr.
Maloof and Mokarzel began publishing al- Asr to attack the Arbeely brothers, 
insisting that they deceived and stole from the Syrian community. By September of 
the same year, Najib and Ibrahim Arbeely sued Maloof for libel. Judging from the
105 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: O ttom an Lebanon, 1861-1920  (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), 182.
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numerous libel lawsuits between him and various editors, the remarks to the American 
press was an attempt to generate business by clearing his name. Besides their business 
ambitions, Maloof and Mokarzel hoped to influence the growing Syrian migrant 
population. Mokarzel recognized the inherent differences along Washington Street, 
where “good industrious Syrians” and “lazy Syrians” coexisted. He noted the 
differences in sects, characteristics, work ethics, and though processes.107
Mokarzel desired to civilize, Westernize, and unify the Syrian community 
through his own newspaper. He did not think Kawkab America was effective in 
retaining tradition Syrian values while teaching the migrant population how to become 
more civil. Mokarzel and Maloof recognized that press constructed the Syrian 
community in the mahjar through printed descriptions of political organization. The 
press also developed educational and financial structures and spread national 
narratives, creating the imagined diasporic community. Maloof understood that the 
diasporic press could hurt his business, so he sought to influence it to generate 
business by partnering with Mokarzel. Mokarzel was against the political 
organizations that the Arbeely brothers represented. Kawkab America tended to be 
pro-Ottoman and pro-Orientalist, which Mokarzel, as influenced by the Maronite 
Church, believed to be backwards and barbarous.108 Mokarzel and Maloof created 
newspapers to rival Kawkab America, because they did not agree with their politics 
nor their sectarian affiliation. Maloof and Mokarzel were staunch supporters of the
107 "Syrians in New York" Al Hoda, February 26 ,1904 .
108 The Arbeely family was reported to throw celebratory parties and invited Ottoman diplomats in the  
Kawkab America office on Sultan Abdulhamid ll's birthday. See "Abdul Hamid's Birthday" The Sun, 
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Maronite Church and the French Consulate.109 In fact, when discussing Arab history, 
Mokarzel contributes the Arab’s knowledge of science to the French missionaries 
rather than discussing the Islamic Renaissance during the Middle Ages.110
Mokarzel was the main instigator of many newspaper wars in the mahjar in the 
first decade of the twentieth century and instigated the newspaper war which led to the 
1905 riots. Whenever the views he presented in Al-Hoda were not accepted by others, 
he fought his opponent until they were defeated. This mentality was troublesome for 
the minority community.111 Mokarzel immigrated to the United States in 1890 and 
created his own newspaper, Al-Hoda, when his brother, Salloum, joined him in 1898. 
The newspaper did not determine a sectarian affiliation when it was first created. In 
its’ first issue, Mokarzel presented al-Hoda as an independent paper for all Syrians, to 
rival newspapers editors loyal to competing empires for influence in Syria (i.e. British, 
Ottoman, Russian, France).112 Since al Hoda was meant for all Syrians in the diaspora, 
Mokarzel made his newspaper competitive by publishing it bi-weekly, on Wednesdays 
and Saturdays. To compete with the Egyptian press which Mokarzel considers the 
“mother of the mahjar,” al-Hoda reported on Syrians migrants in Canada, Mexico, 
Brazil, and Colombia.113 However, impartiality did not last long as Mokarzel 
maintained close relationships with French officials, particularly George Picot, who
109 Naff, 320
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later helped publish the Sykes-Picot Treaty.114 Although Na’um tried to keep al-Hoda 
on an “independent path,” his competitive nature led to his decision to affiliate al- 
Hoda with his Maronite sect four years after the establishment of his newspaper. This 
was due to the publication of a rival Maronite paper, Al-Sakhra, created under the 
leadership of Bishop Yazbek for the Maronite Syrian community. To defeat this rival 
newspaper, Mokarzel printed articles accusing that the staff of al-Sakhra were not true 
representatives of Maronites, but were Greek Orthodox. He accused the “dishonest” 
staff of intending to split the Maronite community.115
To further overcome the competition with al-Sakhra, Mokarzel decided to 
publish his newspaper daily by August 1902. Mokarzel was brutal in his attempts to 
decrease competition in newspapers and the influence of the community, slandering 
his competition, even if they were former colleagues. When one of his writers, Amin 
al- Gharib, decided to create a Syrian nationalist newspaper, al-Muhajir (the 
Immigrant), he became subject to Mokarzel’s attacks.116 Mokarzel’s intentions were to 
destroy the integrity of the competition, so that he could continue to influence the 
Maronite Syrian community. By 1905, this mentality reproduced sectarian tensions in 
the diaspora when he attacked the Greek Orthodox Syrian migrant community, after 
first attacking their bishop, Rafael Hawaweeny. The three main enemies of al-Hoda in
1141 do not have enough research to show if Mokarzel's relationship with George Picot was a major 
aspect of the decision to create a separate Lebanese nation under French Mandate after World War I, 
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the first decade became al- Muhajir, Mira ’at- al Gharb, and Syrian nationalist Bishop 
Hawaweeny.
The Reproduction of Sectarianism in Little Syria
The Syrian migrant community was described as peaceful prior to 1905, with 
the exception of the few court cases. The year 1904, in particular, was a peaceful time 
for the Syrian migrants in the United States, as both the Maronite and the Greek 
Orthodox sects supported the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War to promote the 
prevalence of Christendom. Mira ’at al-Gharb, al-Hoda and the Bishop allied 
themselves with the Russians, and raised money for the Russian Christians to defeat 
the Japanese pagans.117 Good spirits were furthered by Hawaweeny’s appointment to 
Bishop of the Syrian Greek Orthodox Church of the United States of America,
Mexico, and Canada.
There appeared to be peaceful relations among the bourgeoisie of the Syrian 
migrants and their newspapers, as they commandeered the influence of their respective 
communities. Mokarzel had noted that Mira ’at al-Gharb was a colleague of al-Hoda 
when he congratulated Hawaweeny on his appointment to the American Bishopric. He 
called the appointment “a rare and wonderful occasion” for Hawaweeny.118 However, 
the peace between the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox Syrian migrants did not last 
into 1905, as the cosmopolitan elite began resenting Hawaweeny’s growing influence 
in the community. Businessmen used the fragmentation of the Syrian migrant
117 "Syrians and the War" al-Hoda, February 2 6 ,1904
118 "Thoughts of the Colleague M ira 'a t al-Gharb" al Hoda, February 27, 1904
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community to destroy their competition. They paid the newspapers to publish 
slanderous articles to crush their business rivals.
Bishop Hawaweeny created his own bi-monthly journal, al-Kalimah, in 
January 1905, using print capitalism to unite the Syrian migrants in the diaspora. 
Hawaweeny justified the publication of Al-Kalimah to transmit the word of salvation 
and “love of the spiritual ministry to all Syrians, especially to the children of our 
community that are spread over our entire God protected Archdiocese. For because we 
cannot perform this spiritual ministry verbally towards our spiritual children due to 
their diffusion over places far away from the center of the Archdiocese.” 119 The 
magazine was intended for primarily Greek Orthodox Syrians scattered throughout the 
mahjar, but Hawaweeny also intended it for all Syrians in the diaspora. He hoped to 
forge a collective identity with even those further away in the mahjar through the 
journal’s “spirit of love.”120 Unlike the other Arabic newspapers at this time, 
Hawaweeny emphasized in print that al Kalimah would avoid “personal 
allegations/ridicule and avoid all political matters.”121
Hawaweeny kept his word and remained neutral in political matters. Instead, 
he kept busy for most of the year building a Greek Orthodox Church for Syrian 
migrants in Massachusetts, the first Russian Orthodox Church. He travelled 
throughout the United States to perform wedding ceremonies. As the figurehead of the 
Greek Orthodox community in the Americas, Hawaweeny easily wielded the greatest
119 Hawaweeny, Raphael. "The Purpose of the Creation of the Magazine" al-Kalimah, January 1 ,1905, 
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influence in the diaspora. Businessmen tried to manipulate that influence to further 
their business and political ambitions, but Hawaweeny refused to aid these men. Some 
elite members in the mahjar saw Hawaweeny’s resistance as snobbery and it created 
enemies in the diaspora. These enemies were determined to defeat his influence in the 
diaspora, with the same methods they used to undermine their business rivals.
Slanderous newspaper articles to promote business and political interests in the 
diaspora continued until a circular in Little Syria demanded that editors and publishers 
stop publishing paid articles attacking Syrian personalities. According to the American 
newspapers, the circular was published by the Champagne Glass Club (Jami ’at al- 
Akdh), a group of fifteen business men in Little Syria led by Maloof who wanted to 
protect their businesses. Al-Hoda supported these attempts, denouncing Mira ’at al- 
Gharb for printing unnecessary slanderous words which disgusted the Syrian 
community.122 Some diasporic newspapers agreed to stop publishing slanderous 
articles, but Hawaweeny refused to get involved or sign the petition. His refusal 
slanderous articles about Hawaweeny published in al-Hoda. The earliest attack on 
Hawaweeny’s character came in August 1905, where al-Hoda published that 
Hawaweeny was leading his followers down the evil path and called him a snob.123 
Hawaweeny refused to respond to the articles, attempting to maintain his stance that as 
Bishop, his “paths do not lead [him] to politics.”124
Although Hawaweeny refused to respond to the slander, members of his 
congregation did not stand idly by. The editor of the weekly journal Mira ’at al-Gharb,
122 In an article in Al-Hoda, July 27 ,1905
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Najib Diab, responded to the articles to protect Hawaweeny’s reputation. Diab’s 
response led to a series of slanderous articles about Maloof, Mokarzel, Hawaweeny 
and Diab in both newspapers. The slanderous contents of newspaper articles had 
gotten so out of control that Syrian migrants in New York told American reporters that 
they had forbidden their wives and daughters from reading the diasporic newspapers 
altogether.125 Hawaweeny spoke against the newspaper fight after friends of al-Hoda 
begged him to put an end to the squabble.126 On August 23rd, Maloof wrote a scathing 
article in al-Hoda in response to Hawaweeny’s demand to end the newspaper war. 
Maloof reminded Hawaweeny of his “obligation as a servant to the people,” and that 
he is no better than the people he serves and needs to stop acting like it. He accused 
Hawaweeny of being two-faced with double standards and that Diab is Hawaweeny’s 
parrot, contending that Mira ’at al Gharb is run by the Bishop. Among the accusations 
listed against Hawaweeny, Maloof blames Hawaweeny for ruining his enemies, such 
as Hana Abdulnoor and Na’um Mokarzel.127 Maloof claimed that Hawaweeny stated 
that he wanted to prevent the people from reading al-Hoda.128 M aloof s claims were 
attempts to reverse the Bishop’s influence in the mahjar, using the same methods he 
attempted a decade previously with the Arbeely brothers.
M aloof s desperation was transparent to Hawaweeny. Hawaweeny hoped to 
calm his churchmen, who saw M aloof s article as an attack upon the entire Greek
125 "Syrians Stirred Up" New  York Tribune, August 28 ,1905.
126 Ibid
127 Abdulnoor was a prominent Greek Orthodox merchant who lived in Staten Island. Hawaweeny 
assisted his wife with divorcing him. Maloof used the situation to claim that by assisting in the 
dissolution of the marriage, Hawaweeny was attempting to 'ruin' Abdulnoor. He does not specifically 
state the divorce in the article, but it is implied.
128 Najib Maloof "Response to a Response" al Hoda, August 23 ,1905 .
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Orthodox congregation. An attack upon the character of the Greek Orthodox Bishop 
reignited underlying sectarian tensions in Little Syria. Hawaweeny called a meeting 
that night in the basement of his church in Brooklyn to prevent violent reaction to 
M aloof s article. He told the New York Tribune that he asked his churchmen to forgive 
Maloof and Mokarzel, and not pay attention to the attacks.129 The Maronites feared 
that the gathering was a conspiracy. On August 26th Maloof and a group of Maronite 
businessmen from the Champagne Glass Club submitted a formal appeal to Police 
Commissioner McAdoo to protect them from Hawaweeny and his violent Syrian 
Greek Orthodox followers. They claimed to have received threatening letters after 
Hawaweeny’s meeting. The Champagne Glass Club members also claimed that this 
meeting was to demand the churchmen to defend their Bishop’s honor and the 
churchmen took up “Oriental custom” for the congregation to swear to lay down their 
lives for their Bishop. Maloof manipulated Orientalism among the American Press in 
order to counter Hawaweeny’s influence in the diaspora, alienating the Syrian 
population further from the American public.
These events led to more newspaper articles slandering Maloof, Diab,
Mokarzel and Hawaweeny in the next couple weeks. Sectarian differences were 
manipulated to motivate their readers to choose a side in the newspaper battles.
Maloof was a main advertiser in al-Hoda, and was Mokarzel’s partner in their last 
newspaper. Naturally, Mokarzel sought to defend M aloof s reputation to the Maronite 
population. Mokarzel reminded his readers that Maloof is known throughout the 
United States as respectable, moral, and peaceful. He states that Mokarzel was unfairly
129 "Syrians Stirred Up" New  York Tribune, August 28 ,1905.
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attacked for asking newspaper editors to print solely honest and just articles.
Mokarzel’s article indicates that Diab and the Bishop were corrupt in their refusal to 
get involved with Maloof and the Champagne Glass Club. In the same article, 
Mokarzel accuses Diab of debasing himself by publishing articles which disrespect 
Syrian women.130 Mokarzel calls for Mira ’at al- Gharb to be shut down for Diab’s 
abusive attacks on Syrian families.
The tensions between the newspapers’ editors were reflected in the Syrian 
community while acts of sectarian violence began to simmer. Hawaweeny had been 
threatened with assassination as well. He reported that he did “not dare to leave [his] 
home unaccompanied at night” for a couple of weeks.131 On September 16th, 1905, 
tensions led to potential violence when three migrants from Zahle drew weapons upon 
Maronite men. The guns were taken by other peaceful Zahle men, but they were not 
able to prevent one of these angry men from assaulting a “generous Maronite” 
member of the community, who was not named. Mokarzel placed the full 
responsibility of these actions upon Hawaweeny, for encouraging “idiots to consider 
themselves brave vigilantes.”132
By September 18th, skirmishes turned into a full riot between two hundred 
Maronites and Greek Orthodox on Pacific Street. That day a skirmish took place on 
Washington Street as three Maronite merchants from the Champagne Glass Club 
attacked the Greek Orthodox Merchant Nicola Abu Samara. The police arrested 
Maloof, Awad, and Gazal for disturbing the peace. Abu Samara was a close friend of
130 In an article in Al Hoda, September 16 ,1905 , 2
131 "Assassins are After Him, Says Bishop in Riot" The World, September 19 ,1905 .
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Hawaweeny, so rumors spread about an assassination on the Bishop.133 The skirmish 
of that day gave way to a full out riot on Pacific Street that night. Mokarzel reported 
that the shooting began around 9:30 pm with forty-five to fifty shots fired on the 
intersection of Clinton and Pacific Street. He described that the residents left their 
houses crying and shouting on the street due to the commotion. Men began fighting 
while the perpetrators ran away from the scene. Not too long after the sound, a 
wounded Abdo Diab Ashkouti knocked on Mokarzel’s door for sanctuary. A bullet 
had scraped the side of his left thigh, leaving two wounds. Mokarzel explained to have 
welcomed him “as a brother and friend” and cared for his wounded left thigh, until a 
doctor showed up to dress the wounds. The police appeared and arrested six men, 
among them was the Bishop.134 Police deputy Mallon chased after Hawaweeny in full 
sprint for a block.135 Policeman Butler reported that Hawaweeny threw aside a pearl 
handled revolver before Mellon caught him.136
Afterwards the police asked for Ashkouti’s report of the incident, who claimed 
to have been walking to Mokarzel’s house alone with his cane. As Ashkouti turned 
onto the intersection of Pacific Street and Clinton Street, he saw two Syrian men 
walking up to Mokarzel’s house on 137 Pacific Street and another three men passing 
by behind them, one of the men having a long beard. When the men saw Abdo, the 
bearded man proclaimed him to be an enemy and yelled for his companions to kill 
Ashkouti. Shots were immediately fired. According to Ashkouti, at least ten more
133 "Bishop a Prisoner" The N ew  York Daily Tribune, September 19 ,1905 .
134 Na'um Mokarzel, "Rafael Hawaweeny and his Followers in Jail" al Hoda, September 19,1905.
135 "Greek Bishop's Party Attacks Syrian Editor" N ew  York Times, Septem ber 19 ,1905 .
136 "Syrian Bishop in a Cell" The Sun, September 19 ,1905
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armed men walked by with guns and also began shooting. Ashkouti goes on to narrate
a heroic tale of his survival; he told reporters that he broke his cane after hitting three
/
men with it. Afterwards he began grabbing men from the mob to guard himself, only 
to toss them aside and replace his human shields. His goal was to get to Mokarzel’s 
doorstep. Ashkouti did not confirm that the bearded man who initiated the attack was 
Bishop Hawaweeny, since he “did not know the Bishop personally,” but suggested 
that it could have been him.137
Mokarzel admitted to not knowing the full details of the incident, since he 
remained in his house during the riot. He used the American newspapers and 
Ashkouti’s report to try to piece together what happened. Mokarzel even translated the 
newspaper articles from the Times, the Sun, The New York Tribune, The Herald, and 
the World concerning the incident, to allow his readers to determine what happened 
themselves.138 McAdoo misinterpreted the incident as an attack on Mokarzel’s house 
in his police report, allowing the American press to believe that Mokarzel was 
involved. Mokarzel believes McAdoo’s misunderstanding of the events were due to 
rumors that had been circulating the past month that the Greek Orthodox Syrians 
threatened to kill Mokarzel and other Maronite members of the Champagne Glass 
Club. The police report and the American press believed Hawaweeny led an armed 
attack against Mokarzel.
In the police report, Hawaweeny and a few of his friends appeared upon 
Mokarzel’s door step on 137 Pacific Street, where the Champagne Glass Club was
137 Na'um Mokarzel, "Rafael Hawaweeny and his Followers in Jail" al Hoda, Septem ber 19 ,1905 .
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holding a meeting. According to the New York Times, “the minute the Hawaweeny 
party entered the fight began” in the parlor and then out into the street.139 The Sun 
reported that the two factions held an hour long meeting before the fight broke out.140 
The New York Daily Tribune reported that no one entered Mokarzel’s residence, and 
as soon as he saw and heard the men coming, Mokarzel “fled down the backstairs to 
safety,” while his friends prepared themselves to receive the aggressive visitors.141 
Mokarzel contends that no conference was held between the two factions and no one 
entered his residence during the incident. Although Mokarzel denied that Hawaweeny 
and his followers attempted to assassinate him, he still blamed the riot on 
Hawaweeny’s bad rationale in his teachings. A follow-up article in al-Hoda insisted 
that Hawaweeny’s “hissing” created the factionalism and animosity between the 
Maronites and the Greek Orthodox Syrians, splitting the Syrian migrant community.142
Hawaweeny denied any part in the incident, believing that it is just another 
way for his enemies to attempt to hurt him. Hawaweeny claimed that he and a group 
of his parishioners went to visit Samara to pray with him after the earlier attack.143 
When the shooting began, the Bishop claimed to have been peacefully passing by, 
unarmed. According to his sister-in-law, Hawaweeny saw the gathering of men who 
passed and insulted him, but he kept walking until they shot at him.144 Hawaweeny 
explained to reporters of The World that he ran because he believed that the riot was a
139 "Greek Bishop's Party Attacks Syrian Editor" The N ew  York Times, September 19,1905.
140 "Syrian Bishop in a Cell" the Sun, Septem ber 19,1905 .
141 "Bishop a Prisoner" New  York Daily Tribune, September 19,1905 .
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“feigned pistol duel” with the hope of assassinating the Bishop with a stray bullet.145 
He claimed that he had no idea how to use a gun since he had lived in a convent most 
of his life. Hawaweeny spent the night in Butler Street Station, after the magistrate 
refused him bail to maintain the peace and protect Hawaweeny.
The next day the officer who caught Hawaweeny, Mallon, claimed that the 
Bishop shoved the revolver in his face and snapped it twice after he saw the Bishop 
fire the gun at others. This new declaration contradicting his police report that all he 
saw was Hawaweeny running and tossing aside a weapon.146 The contradiction in 
Mallon’s reports shed some public sympathy for Hawaweeny. Police Commissioner 
McAdoo reported to have deemed Mallon’s charge “preposterous.”147 The New York 
newspapers changed their minds about Hawaweeny, believing that a bishop could not 
be capable of such violence after interviewing the Greek Orthodox residents of Little 
Syria. The Sun, The New York Daily Tribune, and the World detailed the libel case 
against Mokarzel, Maloof, and three others from the Champagne Glass Club that 
followed Hawaweeny’s night in jail. McAdoo and Inspector Cross found Maloof and 
Mokarzel’s August appeal that the Bishop had incited his followers to attack them 
baseless. The American newspapers and public now saw Mokarzel and M aloof s 
actions as “Oriental” to ask for protection against a man they planned to attack.148 
Orientalist against the whole Syrian community is clear throughout the American 
press. New York newspapers first believed that the Bishop would call a meeting to
145 "Assassins are After Him, Says Bishop in Riot" The World, September 19,1905 .
146 "Cop says Bishop had a Gun" The Sun, September 20 ,1905 .
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incite an “oriental” ritual to ask his followers to give their lives for him and then 
saying that lie was an oriental custom. The sectarian strife had been attributed to 
orientalism on both sides due to xenophobia.
The Sun reported that the attacks upon Hawaweeny’s reputation was due to the 
Maronites’ jealousy of Hawaweeny’s success with the construction of his church and 
cemetery.149 It was more than Greek Orthodox structures that fueled Maloof and 
Mokarzel’s jealousy; they were threatened by Hawaweeny’s influence over the 
diaspora. Maloof and Mokarzel were unable to pass their circular without his 
signature. Hawaweeny made enemies through his neutrality in the social, commercial 
and political fights among the elite men. Maloof emphasized that Hawaweeny’s stance 
of neutrality was an indication of his being two-faced. Maloof and Mokarzel had 
extensive experience with the American press and the police. They used this 
experience to manipulate the American public and try to break the Bishop’s influence 
over the Syrian community. In attacking the Bishop, Mokarzel and Maloof reproduced 
sectarianism among the Greek Orthodox and Maronites in their communities. Men 
like Abdo Ashkouti fought to defend these elite leaders and their sect.
The factionalism that the diasporic newspapers sparked caused tension and 
more riots throughout the next three months in Little Syria. Hawaweeny appealed to 
McAdoo for protection against the threats of the Champagne Glass Club. The Russian 
Consul General also asked for protection for the Bishop in the form of a guard.150 
Interestingly, while Hawaweeny and the Greek Orthodox Syrian migrants had the
I
149"Cop says Bishop had a Gun" The Sun, Septem ber 20,1905.
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Russian Consul General advocate for them, a French lawyer, Charles Lebarbier 
defended Mokarzel. This court case reflected Syrian politics, with the Russian 
consulate interfering in Ottoman affairs, claiming protection over the Greek Orthodox 
Ottoman subjects and the French claiming protection over the Maronites. Ottoman 
sectarianism and international politics had been reflected in Little Syria due to a feud 
fueled by merchants trying to protect their businesses. Whether Hawaweeny or 
Mokarzel were directly involved with the shooting on September 18th is not as 
important as the fact that their strife in the Syrian diasporic media led to a sectarian 
conflict in Little Syria. Syrian men were willing to kill for their sectarian group and 
leader, even if not directly asked to. Sectarianism was imported and reproduced in the 
Syrian diaspora, as more important than a Syrian ancestry.
The court case only fueled sectarian violence in Little Syria, as the newspapers 
continued to attack each other. By October, Hawaweeny was presented as a murderer 
in al-Hoda. Mokarzel claimed that Hawaweeny hired assassins to kill him and Maloof 
throughout the month. These articles kept fueling the tension in Little Syria, 
continuing the skirmishes and charges among the residents. On September 21st 1905, 
three Greek Orthodox migrants residing on Washington Street attacked Maronite John 
Bontross on Rector Street with three-foot clubs.151 On October 11th 1905, Maloof sued 
Diab for libel. More charges and counter-charges between the Syrians continued to 
trouble Magistrate Wahle’s court. Wahle became impatient with the constant 
skirmishes by October 23rd during M aloof s countercharge that a Syrian assaulted him. 
Wahle interrupted the case and lectured the three hundred Syrians who appeared in his
151 Ib id
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courtroom to make charges and/or represent their faction. He advised the men to settle 
the complaints among themselves and make peace with their neighbors.152 Maloof 
replied that he is afraid for his life because the Bishop had put the price of five 
thousand dollars on his head. Wahle invited Maloof to stay with him to calm him 
down and adjourn the court. Officer Oscar Finn helped file the men out of the court 
room. Unfortunately, as soon as the men filed out of the court room, another riot took 
place on Washington Street.
Twenty-five year old Hafez Abdulmalek left his job at the Mira ’at al-Gharb 
office at six o’clock that evening. Due to the neighborhood tensions and his 
occupation, Abdulmalek requested that Officer Finn escort him to his residence. 
Maronite grocer Moussa Abalan stopped them on Liberty Street and called another 
Patrolman over to arrest Abdulmalek for possessing a whip. This scene attracted an 
angry crowd, as Patrolman Moran arrested Abdulmalek and took him to the Church 
Street Station, where he was discharged. As soon as Abdulmalek was discharged, 
revolvers and knives were drawn and chaos erupted. The fighting among the Syrian 
migrants ensued for an hour and four men were stabbed, including Abalan. The New 
York Times described the rioters as “wild-eyed” and “baring teeth,” as if they were 
barbarians rather than humans.153
Although this was the last major riot in Little Syria, it led to more charges and 
counter-charges. Abalan charged another grocer, Greek Orthodox Tony Sabi with 
stabbing him. Other businessmen hurt their competitors in the same fashion. What
152 "Wahle Tells 300 Syrians to End Feuds" The World, October 23 ,1905
153 "Syrians Riot in Street and Many are Hurt" N ew  York Times, October 24 ,1905 .
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started as a war of words between literary cosmopolitan elite figureheads had 
reconstructed itself as a sectarian battle for merchants. The merchants used the chaos 
to also try to eliminate competition in the mahjar, justifying their actions through 
sectarian languages. Maloof, Mokarzel, and Diab may not have been present at the 
two riots that took place, but their battle of words had precipitated and caused the 
migrant community to faction. When Hawaweeny became involved in the newspaper 
attacks, the factions justified themselves through sectarianism. Sectarianism was 
reproduced through print capitalism and divided the Syrian community. Skirmishes 
and rows continued in Little Syria, with the American newspapers constantly viewing 
the violence as a continuation of the September 18th riot.
Although it seemed that the newspaper editors made their peace with each 
other and with Hawaweeny, they continued to represent their sectarian factions up 
until 1920, when Diab and Mokarzel both attended the Paris Peace Conference to 
advocate for two different visions of nationalism. Diab hoped to influence the Western 
leaders to help construct a separate Syrian nation-state, whereas Mokarzel petitioned 
for the creation of a separate Lebanese nation-state with a Maronite majority and 
French protectorate. Mokarzel’s desire to influence the Maronites in the diaspora 
shifted to trying to create a separate nation for the Maronites, led by the Church and 
influenced by the French.
The migrants claimed to have left the Ottoman Empire and sectarian strife, 
only to reproduce it amongst themselves in their adopted homelands. The reproduction 
of sectarianism was fueled by print capitalism in the diaspora. The cosmopolitan 
literary elite migrants competed for influence in the Syrian mahjar through newspaper
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articles. They slandered their enemies to wield their influence. When Hawaweeny was 
appointed Bishop of the Americas, he became a target. When Hawaweeny became a 
target, the attacks took a sectarian coloring, causing riots in the streets between 
Maronite and Greek Orthodox merchants and peddlers.
Sectarian-based riots in the United States was not a new phenomenon by the 
twentieth century. Philadelphia had seen riots in the 1844 Kensington riots, when 
native Evangelical Protestants attacked Irish Catholic immigrants. Newspaper wars 
were also common in the United States and was prominent in the Arabic newspapers 
of Little Syria. New York itself was riddled with factional riots in other migrant 
communities. The Catholic and Protestant Irish fought among themselves; the Chinese 
migrants were tom between the feuding On Leong Tong and Hip Sing Tong families. 
The Italian migrants were divided between their place of origin (Northern Italian vs. 
Sicilians) and Sicilian mafia gangs. However, rioting was rare for “friendly” Syrian 
community.
The first decade of the twentieth century saw a shift from the facade of a 
national Syrian diasporic community to the further fragmentation of the Syrian 
immigrant community along sectarian along, fermented by the competition of Arabic 
sectarian-affiliated newspapers. The reproduction of sectarianism in Little Syria was a 
reaction to the xenophobia confronted in the diaspora. The violence of its reproduction 
further proved to the American public that Syrians were uncivilized. The New York 
Times referred to the Syrian migrants as “wild-eyed” and frenzied.154 Violence in the 
immigrant communities reinforced the American xenophobia of its South Eastern
154 "Syrians Riot in the Street and Many Are Hurt" N ew  York Times, October 24 ,1905 .
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European and Asian migrants. It justified their beliefs that these new migrants are 
barbarous and would degrade the population. When reporting upon the riots, American 
newspapers made the Syrian migrant population look to be uncivilized, led into moral 
decay by an uncivilized Bishop. American newspapers agreed that the rioting in the 
Syrian colony was worse than the Tong family feuds. American reporters employed 
orientalism and described the Syrians as dark-skinned and animal-like, showing their 
bias about the Syrians. The violent sectarianism in the diaspora only justified nativist 
xenophobia which ultimately led to exclusionary laws to prevent further Syrian 
migrations to the United States.
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Conclusion
Syrian migrants escaped religious economic inequality and sectarian tensions 
by immigrating to the United States, “the land of opportunity”. Syrian migrants were 
lured by the promise of American economic opportunities and safety for Christians 
that the American Presbyterian missionaries and the expositions of 1876 and 1893 
presented to them. These opportunities appeared more favorable than the land-and- 
crop-deprived Mount Lebanon regions, the burden of heavy taxation, and the 
competition against cheaper European goods that the immigrants had experienced in 
the Ottoman Empire. The deprived economic conditions of Syria combined with the 
memories of the brutality of the 1860 massacres were pivotal for the Syrian decision 
to immigrate to the United States, a land in which Christians can prosper. The Arbeely 
family’s immigration is the prime example of how the conditions of the Ottoman 
Empire allowed the Arbeelys to be lured by the promise of economic opportunity and 
lack of sectarian strife that the American Presbyterian missionaries presented to them. 
Other immigrants listened to these promises, and were convinced by the letters from 
migrants and merchants who attended the 1876 and 1893 United States Expositions. 
The letters confirmed that the United States was the land of opportunity.
The Syrian migrants were welcomed with xenophobia when they arrived in the 
United States. The migrants experienced Irish-American harassment in their colony, 
causing them to unite together for the first time as Syrians, or an imagined community 
which connected them with the Syrians in the Ottoman Empire. They put aside their 
differences to demand protection from the authorities for their entire community in
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Little Syria in 1892. The experience of xenophobia led to the creation of an imagined 
Syrian diasporic community as newspapers and family networks kept the immigrants 
connected to Syria. The community turned inwards to focus on itself and daily life in 
Little Syria, to survive the xenophobia their host colony received them with. By the 
twentieth century, the small colony of three hundred Syrian migrants increased ten­
fold, increasing the need for more newspapers to better represent the diverse 
population.
Although the Syrian immigrants sought to escape the sectarian strife that they 
experienced within Syria, under Ottoman governance, they reproduced the same 
sectarian tensions they escaped through print capitalism. Immediately after settling in 
Little Syria, migrants began works to recreate the life they left behind. They united 
and strengthened their congregations, financed for the immigration of priests to tend to 
the needs of these congregations, and built churches to represent their different rites. 
They refused to intermingle, even when attending the same church for religious 
observance on Sundays, remaining fragmented in the mahjar.
The cosmopolitan literary elite manipulated sectarian loyalties, and 
reconstructed a different sort of sectarianism in the diaspora as they fought amongst 
each other for influence over the diaspora. Maloof and Mokarzel worked together to 
slander their enemies, to defeat them. These sectarian divisions led to newspaper wars, 
which escalated to street riots between merchants and two hundred Syrian men on the 
precept of sectarianism when al-Hoda attacked the Greek Orthodox Bishop of the 
Americas, R afael Hawaweeny in 1905. For three months, tensions between the 
Maronite and Greek Orthodox were high as both factions sought to defend their
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sectarian leaders and their businesses. The riots of 1905 fragmented the Syrian 
population along sectarian lines permanently in the diaspora, although they presented 
themselves to the xenophobic public as united Syrians.
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